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This dissertation is composed of three essays which examine the effects of a 
firm’s bankruptcy on its suppliers and customers. Suppliers and customers are considered 
to be stakeholders of the firm with which they trade and face potential costs if the firm 
files for Chapter 11. In the first essay, I examine the puzzle that while there is plenty of 
anecdotal evidence to show that upstream and downstream trading partners face costs 
when their trading partner is distressed, the existing literature seems to find that 
contagion effects are relatively small in magnitude. I propose and test a method which 
potentially reduces noise in the inputs used to determine wealth effects. I show that both 
suppliers and customers of filing firms experience significantly greater negative wealth 
effects due to the trading partner’s distress than what has been documented in the existing 
literature.  
In the second essay, I examine the following question: how do supplier and 
customer stock price effects vary in the cross section when the trading partner becomes 
distressed and files for bankruptcy? I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the 
impact of the filing firm’s distress on upstream and downstream firms depends on 
whether the bankrupt firm is economically distressed or financially distressed. The results 
show that both customers and suppliers of distressed firms face switching costs which 
vary significantly with the probability of successful reorganization of the filing firm, and 
 iv 
 
these costs are higher when the degree of reliance and product specialization are greater. 
The third and final essay examines the trade credit policy of suppliers when their trading 
partner is distressed and files for Chapter 11. Trade credit is an economically important 
source of short-term funds for firms. I study empirically whether the data demonstrate 
that suppliers support customers in times of distress by continuing to extend credit or 
whether distressed customers are denied trade credit by suppliers who want to protect 
their own cash position. Evidence indicates that suppliers may continue to support their 
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In this chapter, I examine the effects of Chapter 11 filing on the filing firm’s 
suppliers and customers. Existing literature shows that firms may adjust both their 
financing and investment policies in order to preserve their product market relationships. 
Titman (1984) models a situation where the possibility of liquidation due to financial 
distress can impose costs on a firm’s customers and suppliers. These costs are higher for 
firms that require greater levels of relationship-specific investments from their suppliers 
or customers. Such firms may choose relatively low levels of debt in their capital 
structure in order to present a less risky image to their suppliers and customers. On the 
other side, suppliers and customers may also affect a firm’s investment policy. 
Williamson (1971) shows that firms may choose to integrate vertically with a supplier or 
customer for increased efficiency in the presence of transaction costs. Given the 
importance of a firm’s upstream and downstream trading partners, it is therefore likely to 
suffer from contagion if a customer or supplier files for bankruptcy.  
Literature describing the effects of bankruptcy on a firm’s upstream suppliers and 





bankruptcy on industry rivals. Lang and Stulz (1992) examine a sample of 
bankruptcies filed between 1970 and 1989 and find that the market value of the equity of 
the bankrupt firms’ competitors decreases significantly at the time of the bankruptcy 
announcement.1  Ferris et al. (1997) also examine the stock price effects and find that for 
every one dollar of equity value lost by a bankrupt firm on the filing announcement date, 
the competitors of the filing firm lose $3.32. Hertzel, Li, Rodgers, and Officer (2008) 
provide the first large sample evidence on the wealth effects of distress and bankruptcy 
filing for suppliers and customers of filing firms. They find that there exists significant 
contagion to suppliers of the filing firm and such effects are more severe when the filing 
firm’s industry also suffers contagion. Specifically, using a sample of 250 Chapter 11 
filings between 1981 and 2004, they find that the average abnormal return for supplier 
portfolios is -1.94% (significant at the 5% level) over the 5 days around filing.  
The financial distress of an economically important customer may give rise to 
multiple sources of losses for the suppliers and customers such as lost sales, increased 
production costs, switching costs, loss on outstanding receivables, or loss of a short-term 
credit supplier. If the filing firm liquidates, permanent loss of cash flows to the trading 
partner may occur. For example, if a supplier files, it would take time for the customer to 
line up a new supplier, negotiate prices and credit terms, and make other adjustments 
necessary to fit the replacement supplier into the customer’s production schedule (Titman 
and Shapiro, 1985). Given the potential economic importance of a filing firm to its 
suppliers and customers, it is puzzling that the degree of empirical effects on the 
                                                 
1 They also present evidence indicating that the competitive effect is simultaneous. Competitive effect is the 
opposite effect of contagion. In this, some firms gain if the rival filing firm is removed from the market as a 





suppliers and customers documented in the literature is so small.2 The importance of 
contagion in the supply chain is anecdotally quite well known. For instance, an article 
appearing in Time.com on November 28, 2008 states that “68% of participants in a 
survey of executives for industry suppliers said their companies would have to downsize 
if General Motors declared bankruptcy, while 12% said their businesses would likely 
close or would definitely do so.”3 The survey went on to state that an estimated 275,000 
jobs would be lost in the Midwest alone as a result of a General Motors (GM) 
bankruptcy. This shows that the potential magnitude of supply chain contagion in GM’s 
case was anticipated to be very high and to have far-reaching consequences. Indeed, the 
potential effects of GM’s bankruptcy on its suppliers were considered sufficiently serious 
for the federal government to authorize five billion dollars out of the TARP funds to keep 
auto parts suppliers afloat.4 While not all filing firms are as large or important as GM, the 
results in Hertzel et al. (2008) are nonetheless puzzling, especially since suppliers in their 
sample generate at least 10% of their total revenue from the bankrupt firm.  
Jorion and Zhang (2009) directly examine wealth effects of large unsecured 
creditors (including suppliers offering trade credit to the bankrupt firm) reported as part 
of the Chapter 11 filing process. They find that these firms experience negative abnormal 
returns. However, this sample may result in the exclusion of those suppliers which 
modified their terms of trade in the prefiling period. Modified terms such as cash on 
delivery may result in the supplier not being on the list of large outstanding creditors at 
                                                 
2 A further puzzling finding in Hertzel et al. (2008) is that they are unable to find any cross-sectional 
characteristics which explain the level of contagion in suppliers and customers of filing firms. See Chapter 
2 for an examination of this topic.  
3  “The Ripple Effect of a Potential GM Bankruptcy” by Steven, Gray, Time.com, November 28, 2008. 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1862737,00.html 
4 Auto Supplier Support Program (ASSP). The funds came from the Troubled Asset Relief Program 





the time of filing.  Nonetheless, the liquidation of the filing firm may mean large losses 
for such suppliers. Even with such large direct exposures, lender firms in Jorion and 
Zhang’s (2009) sample experience relatively small abnormal equity returns of -2.29% 
over a period of 10 days surrounding the filing date.  
One of the reasons for the relatively small contagion effects is that the Chapter 11 
filing is usually a widely anticipated event. Almost every firm takes action before filing 
which is likely to have an effect on the suppliers and customers. Examples include 
announcement of debt restructuring programs, capital expenditure cuts, asset sales, etc. 
Thus for many firms, Chapter 11 is a final step in the renegotiation and restructuring of 
the capital structure. This has been recognized by previous studies relating to bankruptcy. 
For instance Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) and Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell (1996) 
circumvent this problem by identifying the date on which distressed restructurings start. 
Instead of using the filing date, they look for restructuring announcements within 5 years 
prior to the Chapter 11 filing date. Ferris et al. (2003) find they are unable to detect any 
competitive effects among their sample of firms which are rivals to filing firms. They 
posit that this may be because the impact has already been incorporated into stock prices 
prior to the filing date. They work around this problem by evaluating stock price effects 
for the competitors over a period of 100 days prior to the filing date. Using this method, 
they find significant positive abnormal returns for those competitors of the filing firm 
which stood to gain from the elimination of a rival through bankruptcy.  
Hertzel et al. (2008) also recognize that the filing date is noisy and in order to 
gauge the contagion effects accurately, they define the “prefiling distress date.” By 





the year prior to filing with the market capitalization of the previous day, they designate 
the date on which the dollar loss is maximum as the prefiling distress day. Using this 
method, they find that an equally weighted portfolio of suppliers to filing firms 
experience abnormal returns of -0.81% (significant at the 10% level) in the 5-day period 
surrounding the pre-filing distress date. This is puzzling because if the distress date 
properly identifies a date on which relevant news regarding the distress arrives to the 
market, supplier contagion should be greater than that experienced over the filing date (-
1.94% significant at the 5% level). Further, they find that an equally weighted portfolio 
of customers to filing firms experience insignificant abnormal returns in the 5-day period 
surrounding their distress date. 
Given these puzzles, I revisit the problem of suppliers’ and customers’ contagion 
caused by their trading partner’s financial distress. I use a sample of 215 bankruptcies 
filed between 1981 and 2009 and corresponding samples of their suppliers and 
customers. As in previous studies, I find that the event of filing is expected beforehand. I 
then examine the distress date of Hertzel et al. (2008) by collecting the relevant news 
about the filing firm around that date. I find that the prefiling distress date is noisy since 
some firms have either no news at all or no news which is indicative of future distress. In 
a few cases, the dates are inaccurate due to reversals in the market price of the filing firm. 
I propose a different method to choose the date of prefiling distress date so that wealth 
effects can be measured more accurately. I define a less noisy distress date by examining 
individual news articles related to the filing firm over a period of 1 year before filing and 
then identifying various dates on which news of the filing firm’s distress was released to 





Reexamining the supplier and customer contagion using these new distress dates, 
I find that both supplier and customer contagion is significantly higher than what has 
been documented in the literature. Using the 5-day period surrounding the Hertzel et al. 
(2008) distress date leads to supplier abnormal returns of -1.74% (significant at 1% level) 
in my sample while using the distress date defined using actual news articles leads to 
abnormal returns equaling -7.27% (significant at 1% level) over 5 days. Following Ferris 
et al. (2003), I also evaluate long run returns to suppliers over the 1 year prior to the filing 
date and find that suppliers experience significant negative abnormal long run returns 
over the period. This confirms that news regarding the filing firm’s distress arrives in the 
market in spurts and using news articles to ascertain distress dates reduces the noise level 
in the abnormal returns. This allows for a more accurate measure of supplier wealth 
effects. Turning to the customers, I find the effects to be just as significant. While 
existing literature does not find any significant contagion effects for the customers, I find 
that in my sample, customers experience significant negative abnormal returns equaling -
1.87% (significant at 1% level). Customers may be the reason behind the filing firm’s 
distress, e.g., if shifting customer demand away from the filing firm causes the distress. 
However, the finding that customers also experience abnormal returns shows that distress 
not only flows upstream but downstream as well.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the 
relevant literature while Section 1.3 describes the sample of bankruptcies and the process 
of identifying suppliers and customers used throughout this dissertation. Section 1.4 





presents the new method. Section 1.5 discusses the contagion results using the new 
distress date, while Section 1.6 concludes.   
 
1.2 Literature review 
Contagion within an industry has long been cited as one of the effects of 
bankruptcy. Such intra-industry contagion can arise from two sources: firstly, suppliers 
and customers of a bankrupt firm may become wary of doing business with other firms in 
the same industry and move away from the entire industry, or the event of filing may 
release negative information about the filing firm since the components of the filing 
firm’s cash flows are likely to be correlated with other firms in the same industry. 
Supporting this, Aharony and Swary (1983) find that in banks, if bankruptcy is caused by 
firm-specific events such as fraud, contagion does not occur, whereas if the filing is 
associated with industry-wide cash flow problems, negative contagion effect occurs.  
Lang and Stulz (1992) provide large-scale evidence of such intra-industry 
contagion. Using data from 1970-1989, they show that positive competition effects 
associated with bankruptcy filings are present in industries with low level of competition 
and low leverage. Industries with high competition and high leverage experience 
contagion effects when a rival firm files for Chapter 11. The reason for this is that with a 
lower level of competition, nonfiling rivals will find it easier to take advantage of the 
bankrupt firm’s financial difficulties while firms with lower leverage will have increased 
flexibility to expand their market share to include that of the rival filing firm. Ferris et al. 
(2003) confirm these findings regarding intra-industry contagion using a more recent 





While early research examined these sources of contagion in the context of 
industry, the same reasoning can be applied to a filing firm’s upstream and downstream 
trading partners. For instance, a firm filing Chapter 11 may directly convey negative 
information about cash flows of suppliers (potentially reduced sales) or customers (higher 
input prices). In addition to information about the correlated components of cash flow of 
the filing firm and its trading partners, supply chain contagion may also be caused by the 
suppliers and customers of the filing firm’s trading partners (i.e., second tier trading 
partners of the filing firms) moving away from them in anticipation of distress. Titman 
(1984) describes a model where suppliers, customers, and employees are wary of the 
costs of a filing firm’s liquidation and are reluctant to do business with such a firm. The 
flow of distress may be anticipated prior to the actual distress occurring and such 
expectations may give rise to costs both up and down the supply chain. Titman’s (1984) 
model predicts that if the firm in question supplies or buys unique goods, costs imposed 
on the trading partners will be higher and in order to induce such reluctant trading 
partners to remain in business, the firm will have a lower leverage. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) find empirical evidence to support this 
theory.  
Jorion and Zhang (2009) examine wealth effects of the large unsecured creditors 
reported as part of the Chapter 11 filing process and while they do not separate supplier 
firms from other type of creditors, a portion of their sample of creditors is likely to be 
composed of suppliers to the filing firm. They find that for their subset of industrial 
firms, the largest unsecured creditors experience significant negative abnormal returns 





filing firms, those whose returns are most correlated with the filing firms and those 
whose recovery rates, are likely to be the least experience the greatest abnormal negative 
returns. Boone and Ivanov (2011) examine whether parties involved in strategic alliances 
and joint ventures with the filing firm suffer from spillover effects due to the bankruptcy. 
They find evidence that on average, such strategic alliance partners experience negative 
stock price reaction around the filing announcement.  
However, while both the above studies examine contagion effects, the study that 
finds the most direct evidence of supply chain contagion due to bankruptcy is Hertze et 
al. (2008). This study finds significant average wealth effects of distress and bankruptcy 
filing on dependent suppliers of filing firms. Within their sample of 250 Chapter 11 
filings, they find the average filing-period abnormal return for supplier portfolios to be -
1.94% (significant at the 5% level). Hertzel et al. (2008) also examine the interaction 
between vertical as well as horizontal flow of distress from the filing firm. They find that 
suppliers experience an average abnormal filing-period return of -4.76% (significant at 
the 1% level) for the subsample of filings in which horizontal rivals of filing firms have 
negative filing-period abnormal returns. In comparison, their subsample of suppliers to 
filing firms with nonnegative rival abnormal returns experiences insignificant abnormal 
returns. Hertzel et al. (2008) also define a prefiling distress date to measure the prefiling 
effects on the supply chain. They use the date in the year prior to filing when the 
bankrupt firm had the largest dollar abnormal loss. Using this date, they find that the 
average distress period abnormal return to suppliers of filing firms is -0.81% (significant 
at the 10% level). No significant results for the customers of filing firms are obtained. 





which are likely to be associated with the cross-sectional variation in the level of 
contagion experienced, but no significant characteristics emerge from their tests that can 
explain the patterns of contagion in their sample.  
In sum, the existing literature provides several explanations as to why supply 
chain contagion may exist and provides some preliminary evidence to show that such 
effects actually exist in the market. However, the effects documented so far in the 
literature with respect to suppliers of filing firms are very small, especially when 
compared to the potential magnitude of supply chain contagion suggested by anecdotal 
evidence. In addition, no contagion effects for customers of filing firms have been 
detected empirically. Further, the cross-sectional variation in supply chain contagion has 
not been fully examined in the literature.  
 
1.3 Sample selection and data description 
I start with the Lo Pucki Bankruptcy Research Database for the initial sample of 
869 Chapter 11 filings between 1980 and 2009. Each of these firms possesses assets of at 
least $100 million (in 1980 dollars) at the time of filing and at least one publicly traded 
stock. I match the filing firms to all firms reported as customers or suppliers in the 
company segment data available on Compustat. Since these data contain only a text 
abbreviation for customers’ names for a reporting supplier, I use a text matching code to 
match the abbreviated customer name with the set of bankrupt firms to form the 
supplier—filing customer pairs. I then invert the same code to match the abbreviated 





reporting supplier is in the sample of bankruptcies. I visually inspect every customer-
supplier pair found by the code to ascertain that the match is accurate.  
In order to ensure a reasonable sample size, I follow Hertzel et al. (2008) and look 
for a match up to 5 years before the filing date. If multiple matches between the same two 
firms occur, I choose the one closest to the filing year. I manually check the annual 
reports of a subsample of the firms to ensure that relationships are still maintained even if 
the match is made a while before the actual filing. I am able to find 292 filing firms 
which have either a supplier or a customer or both. Out of these, 50 filing firms drop out 
due to nonavailability of CRSP returns for the trading partner. The final sample consists 
of 215 filing firms for which I am able to find all data needed.5  
Figure 1.1 illustrates the dating convention.  The distress date, described in the 
next section, is determined based on a news event within the 12 months prior to the 
Chapter 11 filing.  “FYE” indicates fiscal year ends relative to the filing date.  The filing 
date, F, occurs between time -1 and time 0.  The distress date occurs sometime between 
time “x”, which is 12 months before the filing date and the filing date, F, between time -2 
and time -1. 
Panel A of Table 1.1 presents the distribution of filing firms by year and Panel B 
presents the distribution of supplier-customer links for each decade. Panel C presents the 
statistics by industry.  Of the 215 filing firms for which there is enough data to calculate 
the probability of reorganization, 118 have at least one supplier and 131 have at least one 
customer. The sample of suppliers consists of 328 individual suppliers (an average of 
around 3 suppliers per filing firm) and the number of customers equals 284 (an average 
                                                 
5 A further 4 bankrupt firms are lost as Compustat data to calculate the distress type are not available while 






of around 2 customers per filing firm). The sample is concentrated over the 1999 to 2003 
period (114 firms or 48% of the sample) and correspondingly, there is a large proportion 
of firms in the business equipment industry in the sample. The relatively large number of 
suppliers for the bankrupt customers in years 1987 and 2009 arise from the inclusion of 
Texaco in 1987 and General Motors in 2009. The sample is evenly distributed across 
most of the industry groups. Following Hertzel et al. (2008), I include the finance and 
utilities industries in the sample. These are treated differently under the bankruptcy law 
but since here the focus is on their trading partners, I do not expect their differential 
treatment under Chapter 11 to affect the results. Nevertheless, I repeat the tests after 
dropping these firms and find that the results remain virtually unchanged.  
 The main variable of interest in all of the tests in this chapter is the wealth effect 
of the filing firm’s trading partner. It is measured by cumulative abnormal return for the 
supplier or the customer over a 5-day period centered around a date on which relevant 
economic information about the distressed partner is released to the market.6 I follow the 
approach of Hertzel et al. (2008) and compute abnormal returns using the market-
adjusted returns method (Brown and Warner, 1985), in which the daily abnormal return is 
the firm-specific return minus the value-weighted market return from CRSP.  
 
1.4. Distress date 
1.4.1 Rationale for examining modified prefiling distress date 
 Very few Chapter 11 filings come as a surprise since most firms try to avoid 
bankruptcy by restructuring their assets and liabilities and Chapter 11 is often the final 
step in the resolution of distress (Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994). If the market 
                                                 





is already well informed about the distress at the time at which wealth effects are 
measured, effects on the supply chain will be measured inaccurately. For this reason, 
Hertzel et al. (2008) define the prefiling distress date as the day of the previous 12 
months on which the firm has the largest abnormal dollar loss. The dollar loss is 
measured as the filing firm’s return less the CRSP value weighted index return multiplied 
by the market capitalization of the filing firm of the previous day.  
Keeping in view that Hertzel et al. (2008) are unable to find any particular cross- 
sectional characteristics explaining the level of contagion effects in their sample, I 
reexamine the distress dates for this sample by conducting Lexis Nexis searches for news 
around those dates. I begin by verifying that the distress dates are indeed caused by 
filing-firm specific news and are not caused by exogenous news such as that from the 
industry, suppliers, or customers. I find that this cannot be completely ruled out. For 
instance, Rhythm Net Connections which filed on August 1, 2001 had a distress date on 
August 9, 2000 (abnormal return = -20.5%). During the prefiling distress period, 
Northpoint Communications, one of Rhythm’s competitors, came to an agreement with 
Verizon to merge their DSL. This caused stocks of firms such as Rhythm Net 
Connections and Covad to fall as these were Northpoint's rivals in the DSL business as 
well as suppliers to Verizon. This is an exogenous news event not caused by Rhythm and 
inclusion of the returns on this date for its suppliers will lead to noise in the tests. 
Secondly, I find that when there exists the type of news mentioned in Hertzel et al. 
(2008), e.g., debt downgrades, earnings warnings, missed earnings expectations, it is not 
always necessarily indicative of the onset of that magnitude of distress which would 





Inc, an internet firm that filed for bankruptcy on April 21, 2001. The distress date is 
September 5, 2000 when it announced that the third quarter revenue for 2000 would fall 
10% from that in the second quarter. While this 10% drop could indicate the onset of 
contagion causing distress, it may not be a sure sign of the imminence of such distress. 
For instance, Servidyne Inc, another firm belonging to the same two-digit SIC code, 
experienced a 48.8% drop in revenue over the same two quarters but did not need to 
restructure. Anacomp Inc, another firm in that industry, also had a 15% revenue drop 
over the same quarter but continued to operate. Approximately 28% of the bankrupt 
customers examined in this study have distress dates on which earnings announcements 
took place. While a drop in revenue on the distress date may foretell the likelihood of 
future distress, not all firms with revenue drops of 10% move into the type of distress that 
befell Xpedior. If we look further down the timeline, on March 20, 2001, Xpedior 
announced that it would be impossible or difficult for it to continue without additional 
capital after June, that it received notice of default for several covenants, it failed to 
receive an unqualified report from its auditors, and that NASDAQ would delist its stock 
due to noncompliance with minimum price requirements. It is much more likely that the 
greatest impact on suppliers or customers of Xpedior would occur around this date when 
the magnitude of the severity of the distress becomes clear.  
Table 1.3 provides further evidence of the noisiness of the distress date measure. 
It shows the distress dates for some of the bankrupt firms in this sample for which I am 
unable to find any news on or around the distress date at all. While there are not many 
(11% of the bankrupt customers) such firms where no news is available, in a small 





noisy observations would cause any cross-sectional effects to remain unobserved. Table 
1.4 shows some of the filing firms for which it is unclear whether or not the news around 
the distress date is negative or not. Examples include Microage Inc. and Northpoint 
Communications. The former filed on April 13, 2001 (distress date December 2, 1999) 
and a deal to combine its services with those of Qwest Communications International Inc. 
was announced on December 1, 1999. This deal would allow it to offer an array of 
broadband internet solutions. Northpoint Communications, which filed on Jan 16, 2001 
announced on its distress date (April 3, 2000) that it was partnering with Netopia and 
NeedBandwidth to launch the NeedBandwidth DSL Center powered by NorthPoint and 
Netopia. A possible explanation for these large negative dollar returns on days on which 
seemingly no negative news came out can be found by examining another bankrupt 
customer—Metricom Inc. which filed on July 2, 2001. It announced on July 24, 2000 
(distress date July 25, 2000, abnormal return -17.98%) that it had launched its Ricochet 
128 kbps/sec wireless data network in San Diego. This was followed by an 
announcement on July 25, 2000 that it had reached “a major milestone in its efforts to 
deploy its Ricochet network in the state of Rhode Island by executing an attachment 
agreement with Narragansett Electric Company.” On July 24, the abnormal return was 
+44.37% and over a 5-day period centered on the distress date, the CAR equals +10.07%. 
It is possible that the inflated market capitalization on July 24, 2000 and the reversal on 
July 25, 2000 caused a misattribution of the distress date to this particular day.  
Overall, I find that the distress date is a noisy measure of the actual date on which 
the first news of distress relevant to the suppliers or customers came out. Tables 1.3 and 





bankrupt customer and it is evident from some of the large positive numbers that the 
wealth effects documented in Hertzel et al. (2008) are understated due to the noise in 
their distress date measure.  
 
1.4.2 Redefined distress date 
I try to find a date on which unambiguous information indicating that the trading 
partner is in distress is released. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) and Tashjian, Lease, and 
McConnell (1996) identify the date on which distressed restructurings start. They define 
distressed restructurings as transactions in which existing debt is replaced by a new 
contract. A restructuring begins if there is an announcement within 5 years prior to the 
Chapter 11 filing date or out of court restructuring date that the firm is renegotiating with 
creditors, has already renegotiated, or has defaulted. Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein 
(1994) identify different types of restructuring that distressed firms undertake, including 
bank debt or public debt restructuring, asset sales, and reduction of capital expenditures. 
However, since a debt restructuring in anticipation of default is a response to financial 
distress, I modify their method to look for information indicating onset of, rather than 
response to, distress.  
The process I use to do this is as follows. I search for news articles in Lexis 
Nexis’s “All Newspapers and Wires” category over the period of 1 calendar year prior to 
filing date using the firm name. From these articles, I choose in order of availability 1) 
any news mentioning suppliers or customers of the filing firm explicitly suggesting a 
response to the distress in their trading partner, e.g., suppliers refusing to extend credit or 





restructuring, that the firm is unlikely to recover, or that it is facing distress and will 
likely fail if restructuring/refinancing is not obtained; 3) news that a firm has hired an 
advisory or investment firm for potential restructuring, fails to make debt payments, or it 
has a going concern qualification by its auditor; and lastly, 4) any announcement of an 
attempt at asset restructuring such as asset sales, mergers, capital expenditure reductions, 
and layoffs or debt restructuring. If multiple items in any category are available, I take 
the earliest.  
Direct information pertaining to trading partners is the first choice for identifying 
distress dates since suppliers and customers have a direct motivation to monitor their 
trading partners. In addition to the loss of future profits, suppliers also stand to lose goods 
in progress. In addition, suppliers and customers to the filing firm may be locked into 
sales/purchase agreements with the filing firm. Suppliers also stand to lose any trade 
credit that is yet to be paid by the filing firm. Trade credit theories posit that sellers may 
be better informed about the filing customer firm since the suppliers offer financing to the 
customer in the form of trade credit when other forms of financing are not available 
(Biais and Gollier, 1997; Brennan et al., 1988; Bukart and Ellingsen, 2004; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997; Smith, 1987). Thus, suppliers and customers are in a position to release new 
information to the market about the filing firm.  
However, choosing such dates also gives rise to the concern that wealth effects of 
suppliers and customers are driven by information about themselves rather than their 
filing customer. To mitigate this concern, I perform two types of check on the filing firms 
for which there is at least one supplier. I focus on the filing firms which have suppliers 





their distressed supplier and all the dates in this category of articles are based on 
suppliers, rather than customers, to filing firms. Firstly, I find that only 6% of the dates 
for the filing firms with suppliers belong to the first category. Excluding these 
observations from subsequent regressions keeps the results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. I also redo the date choice process by searching exclusively for dates when 
bankruptcy of the filing firm was first mentioned as a possibility, either by the firm itself 
or by analysts or other market participants (and not suppliers to the filing firm). I find that 
the regression estimates remain qualitatively unchanged. 
I choose failed restructuring attempts next since these are likely to have the 
maximum impact on the trading partners. Since many suppliers function as short-term 
creditors to their customers, they may keep on extending credit even if they know that 
their trading partner is distressed. Thus, it is expected that such suppliers will be affected 
the most when they have already stretched themselves in expectation that the trading 
partner will restructure successfully and it does not happen. In absence of the first two 
criteria, news which reflects onset of distress such as missed debt payments or hiring an 
advisory firm for restructuring is chosen. I focus on these since chronologically, they 
either appear before any restructuring attempts are made or are the very first steps in the 
restructuring process. As the last choice, I pick those news stories that indicate that an 
attempt at asset or liability restructuring has been made. These are not unambiguous bad 
news for the trading partners and hence are the last choice. In the rare case where there is 
no attempt at a restructuring before filing, the filing or the announcement of filing is 
taken as the onset of distress. For the sample of bankrupt firms which have at least one or 





belong to the first group, 33% to the second group, 37% to the third group, 19.5% to the 
fourth category, and 4% for which we use the filing date. 
Comparing these new distress dates (henceforth referred to as the “distress date”) 
to the date of Hertzel et al. (2008) (henceforth referred to as “value loss date”), I find that 
on average (median), the distress date occurs 99 (96) days after the value loss day. Figure 
1.2 shows the market capitalization and the dollar loss for Northpoint Communications 
over the year before filing. As the market capitalization becomes smaller due to falling 
stock prices, the dollar loss in value also tends to fall. This leads to value loss dates which 
are on average earlier than the distress dates. 145 of the bankrupt firms have distress 
dates after the value loss date (mean 153 days).7 Thus, the lack of cross-sectional results 
for Hertzel et al. (2008) could result from the market not being able to understand the 
level of distress of the bankrupt trading partners at an early stage.  
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 compare the equal weighted abnormal returns for the supplier 
portfolios of various bankrupt customers. It can be seen that the distress-period abnormal 
returns are consistently negative and larger in absolute values than those calculated for 
the value loss dates. Table 1.5 shows the median dollar losses to all the suppliers of 
bankrupt customers for whom abnormal returns on all three dates are available. Thirty-
three (corresponding to 12 different bankrupt customers) suppliers are available for 
whom dollar values are available on all three dates and both the distress and the value 
loss dates are the same. The median loss to suppliers on the distress date is $ -3.16 
million while it is $ -2.41 million on the value loss date and $-0.48 million on the filing 
date. Therefore, while the value loss dates are an improvement upon the filing dates in 
                                                 
7 Twenty-four have their distress dates on average 149 days ahead of the value loss dates and 19 occur on 
the same day. Twenty-seven have missing value loss date. The median (mean) number of days between the 





capturing the information effects of distress on suppliers, the distress dates identified in 
this study are a further improvement. As the measure becomes less noisy, the impact on 
the suppliers becomes more evident.  
 
1.5 Empirical results for suppliers and customers to bankrupt firms 
I begin by looking at the abnormal returns for the sample of suppliers and 
customers for the three dates, namely the filing date, distress date, and the value loss date. 
Table 1.6 presents the results. For each bankruptcy, I form equal-weighted supplier or 
customer portfolios and find the equal-weighted averages of these portfolio returns. For 
the suppliers, the returns in Table 1.6 show that the magnitudes of the abnormal returns 
around the distress date are much higher than those on the filing- or the value loss dates. 
While for the overall sample of suppliers I find an insignificant abnormal return of 
0.18%, on the filing date, it increases to -1.65% on the value loss date which is significant 
at the 1% level. However, the abnormal return on the value loss date is much smaller than 
the -6.93% (significant at the 1% level) that is found on the distress date. This shows that 
the economic impact of supplier contagion is much higher than what has been 
documented in the existing literature.  
In order to examine the effects of bankruptcy on the filing firm’s rivals, Ferris et 
al. (2003) evaluate stock price effects for the competitors over a period of a hundred days 
prior to the date of filing. They do this in order to avoid the problem of underassessment 
of effects if the impact of filing has already been incorporated into stock prices prior to 
the filing date. Using the long run method, they find significant positive stock price 





the elimination of a rival through bankruptcy. I also check the robustness of the supplier 
results presented in Table 1.6 by using a longer period event study.  
News regarding the filing firm’s distress generally comes out in stages and I pick 
the date that is likely to contain the greatest level of news regarding the magnitude of 
customer distress. We should obtain similar, though more noisy, results if longer term 
event studies are used. I use a buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR)-based 
methodology (Barber and Lyon, 1997) for implementing a longer period event study. To 
find a matching firm for each supplier, the firm that has the following characteristics is 
chosen: the match firm has the closest (but larger than) market capitalization to the 
supplier in the year before filing, belongs to the same exchange, and has the same 2-digit 
SIC code. If the best matching firm does not have data for the event period, I replace it 
with the next best market-capitalization-based match. If the supplier happens to be the 
largest in its group, I use the second largest firm as the match. Implementing this method 
to calculate the abnormal returns for suppliers, I find that over the 3 months prior to 
filing, suppliers to filing firms experience a statistically and economically significant -
25% buy and hold abnormal return.  
Table 1.6 also shows the event study results using equally weighted customer 
portfolios around the 5-day period surrounding the distress date, value loss date, and the 
filing date. The overall customer sample has significant negative returns (-1.87% 
significant at the 1% level) around the distress date. While the effect is weaker relative to 
the supplier group, it is economically significant. Customers may cause the financial 
distress of their filing supplier firms by moving their demand away from these suppliers. 





supplier. As can be seen from the results in Table 1.6, the magnitude of customer 
abnormal returns is much smaller than that for the suppliers. Further, for any customer-
supplier pair, the supplier must be in the Compustat segment database. This implies that 
while the supplier is reliant on the customer, the opposite may not be true. Therefore, the 
results for the customers are expected to be weaker relative to that for the suppliers to 
filing firms. It is interesting to note that customers to filing firms in this sample show 
significant negative wealth effects around the value loss date as well. This is in contrast 
to the results found in Hertzel et al. (2008). Since a similar methodology to theirs is 
implemented in this table, the differences could be due to sample differences.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 I analyze the upstream and downstream flow of contagion when a firm is in 
distress and files for reorganization under Chapter 11. The effects documented in the 
literature to date are small compared to what can be expected given the economic 
importance of the filing firm to the trading partners, especially to the supplier firms. In 
addition, no contagion effects for the customers have been documented empirically to 
date. I hypothesize that this arises since event dates used in the prior literature are either 
too noisy or, if the filing date is used, are fraught with problems of information leakage. 
In order to overcome this problem, I define filing-firm distress date as that day of the year 
prior to filing on which the market receives relevant news regarding the onset of distress 
in the filing firm. Using hand-collected dates, I examine the stock price effects on the 
filing firm’s suppliers and customers and find that the existing literature significantly 






Sample of Chapter 11 firms and links between suppliers and customers 
Panel A: Yearly distribution of Chapter 11 filings included in sample 
This table shows the yearly distribution of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings included in the sample. 
Filing firms are those that filed for Chapter 11 between 1981 and 2009, which have assets worth 
at least $100 million in 1980 dollars, possess at least one publicly traded security, have at least 
one identified publicly traded supplier or customer, and enough data to calculate the probability 
of reorganization.  
1981-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
Filing Year Number of filings Filing Year Number of filings Filing Year Number of 
filings 
   1990 10 2000 18 
1981 1 1991 7 2001 29 
1982 5 1992 3 2002 24 
1983 2 1993 7 2003 17 
1984 3 1994 1 2004 8 
1985 2 1995 3 2005 10 
1986 3 1996 4 2006 3 
1987 3 1997 3 2007 2 
1988 1 1998 6 2008 7 
1989 4 1999 12 2009 17 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of supplier-customer links by decade  
This table shows the distribution of the links between suppliers and/or customers and the filing 
firms by decade. Filing firms are those that filed for Chapter 11 between 1981 and 2009, which 
have assets worth at least $100 million in 1980 dollars, possess at least one publicly traded 
security, have at least one identified publicly traded supplier or customer, and enough data to 
calculate the probability of reorganization. Suppliers and customers of filing firms are identified 
from firms reporting major customers in Compustat segment data. Any firm listing a filing firm 
as a customer in the five years prior to filing is labeled a supplier and vice versa. Column two 
shows the distribution by decade for the overall sample while the third column shows the number 
of filing firms that have at least one customer. The fourth column shows the average number of 
customers in each filing firm’s portfolio. The fifth and sixth columns show the corresponding 




filing firms with 
at least one 
supplier or one 
customer 
Number of 
filing firms with 









with one or 
more suppliers 
Average number 
of suppliers for 
each filing firm 
1981-1989 24 12 1.79 16 3.60 
1990-1999 56 36 2.35 28 2.03 
2000-2009 135 83 2.44 74 2.68 
Overall 
sample 





Table 1.1 continued 
Panel C: Distribution of sample of Chapter 11 filings by industry  
The first and second columns show the distribution of Chapter 11 filings included in our sample classified by the Fama French twelve 
industry groups. Filing firms are those that filed for Chapter 11 between 1981 and 2009, which have assets worth at least $100 million in 
1980 dollars, possess at least one publicly traded security, have at least one identified publicly traded supplier or customer, and enough 
data to calculate the probability of reorganization. Suppliers and customers of filing firms are identified from firms reporting major 
customers in Compustat segment data. Any firm listing a filing firm as a customer in the 5 years prior to filing is labeled a supplier and 
vice versa. Column three shows the number of filing firms that have at least one customer and columns four and five show the mean and 
median number of customers in each filing firm’s portfolio. The sixth, seventh, and eighth columns show the corresponding figures for the 





filing firms with 
one or more 
customers 
Average number of 
customers in  filing 
firm's portfolio 
Median number 
of customers in 
filing firm's 
portfolio 
Number of filing 
firms with one or 
more suppliers 
Average number 









21 16 2.25 2.0 12 2.75 1.5 
Chemicals 5 3 3.00 1.0 3 1.33 1.0 
Durables 15 13 3.23 3.0 6 10.50 3.5 
Energy 15 13 2.00 2.0 5 7.00 1.0 
Health 4 2 1.50 1.5 3 1.00 1.0 
Manufacturing 36 29 2.14 1.0 14 1.86 1.0 
Finance 8 3 1.00 1.0 6 1.17 1.0 
Nondurables 24 22 1.77 1.0 7 1.71 1.0 
Other 31 13 1.92 1.0 21 1.76 1.0 
Shops 30 6 1.67 2.0 24 2.96 2.0 
Telecom 23 10 2.20 2.0 14 2.07 1.0 








Chronology of announcements leading to Xpedior Inc’s Chapter 11 filing 
This table contains all announcements that were made either by or about Xpedior Inc. during the year prior to its Chapter 11 filing. Value 
Loss Date is that day of the year prior to filing on which the filing firm experiences the largest abnormal loss of shareholder wealth as 
measured by the abnormal percent return on the corresponding day multiplied by the market-capitalization from CRSP for the prior day. 
Distress date is as defined in Section 3. Abnormal returns are computed using the market-adjusted returns method (Brown and Warner, 
1985), in which the daily abnormal return is the return of the firm less the CRSP value-weighted market return. Distress Date is defined as 
in Section 3. Standard errors are computed as described in Patell (1976). ***, **, or * indicates that the average is significantly different 






April 25 2000: Revenues for Q1 00 rose 84% from Q1 99—a historic high for the firm. Reduced EBITDA loss. (AR = - 3.49%) 
September 5 2000: Announced that it expects Q3 revenue to fall 10% from Q2. (Value Loss Date) (AR = - 22.82%***) 
September 26 2000: Enacted action plan to resume revenue growth by enforcing a 16% reduction in workforce, key management changes and 
consolidation of geographic segments. (AR = - 2.11%) 
November 2 2000: Announced that it lost $ 38.5 m in Q3 and $5 m in Q2, that the CEO, board chairman, president of U.S. operations and the 
president of international operations all left and had obtained $30 million extra credit from its banker and from PSINet, the stakeholder of 80% of 
Xpedior. (AR = - 31.77%***) 
December 5 2000: Cut 32% cut of its work force and planned to close four offices. (AR = - 34.97%***) 
February 1 2001: Sold Xpedior UK operations to Arthur Andersen for generating funds (AR = - 17.41%**) 
 March 20 2001: (Distress Date) (Delisted from this time onwards) 
1. Announced that it anticipated it would have funds only until June 30, 2001 and after that would need additional capital which would be 
“difficult (or impossible)” to obtain.  So it would continue to explore “strategic alternatives for the sale of all or part of its remaining 
operations.  Further announced that even if it is successful in its efforts, it is likely that the common stock will have no value and if 
necessary for orderly disposal of its assets, Chapter 11 was possible”.  
2. Announced it would receive a going concern qualification in its audit opinion from its auditors and receive a notice of default under certain 






















3.   Announced it had received a notice from NASDAQ that its common stock has failed to maintain the required minimum bid price of $1.00 over a 
period of 30 consecutive trading days and the firm did not anticipate that it would be able to regain compliance with this NASDAQ listing 
requirement.  
4.   Announced the layoff of 42% of its workforce and closure of four more offices. 
March 21 2001: NASDAQ said that it had halted trading in Xpedior Inc 
March 26 2001: Announced that it filed a Form 15 with the SEC to suspend its obligation to file periodic reports for 90 days and a request with 
NASDAQ to delist its shares. 






Examples of bankrupt customers with no news available on value loss date 
The following table contains the different dates for some of the bankrupt customers and their suppliers’ abnormal returns over these dates. 
Value Loss Date is that day of the year prior to filing on which the filing firm experiences the largest abnormal loss of shareholder wealth 
as measured by the abnormal percent return on the corresponding day multiplied by the market-capitalization from CRSP for prior day. 
Distress Date is as described in text. Abnormal returns are computed using the market-adjusted returns method (Brown and Warner, 
1985), in which the daily abnormal return is the return of the firm less the CRSP value-weighted market return. The abnormal returns are 
cumulated for days -2 to +2 relative to the filing-, relevant- and distress- day, and daily abnormal returns are calculated using Market 
Adjusted Returns (MAR) with the CRSP value-weighted index as the market index.  Equal-weighted customer and supplier portfolios are 
formed from the individual customers and suppliers for each filing.  
Company 
Name 
Filing Date Value Loss 
Date 








News on Relevant Date 
Revere Brass 
and Copper Inc 




Suspends operations at its Alabama aluminum 
plant due to depressed markets . 600 jobs lost. 
Best Products 
Inc 




 A supplier (Sharp) sues for 2.5 million worth 
of unpaid supplies. News that Best has stopped 
paying suppliers and is not accepting shipments 
of merchandise.  News comes after withdrawn 









Announced that it is operating at break-even 
margins, will preserve liquidity by delaying 
construction of its ethanol plant in Indiana, 
reducing inventory, and increasing borrowing. 
Carter Hawley 
Hale Stores Inc 




News report stating that "Carter Hawley Hale 
Stores Inc....is feeling pressure from some 
credit agencies, who say the company is late 
paying bills.” Reports that the firm is 90 days 
late in paying bills.  
Paging 
Network Inc 




Defaults on two interest payments and rumors 
circulate that it may have to file Chapter 11 to 













Filing Date Value Loss 
Date 
















Announces that it missed 35 mortgage 
payments and reports circulate saying that the 
firm is "flirting with bankruptcy.”    
Nucorp Energy 
Inc 




Announces that it is facing ''a severe liquidity 
problem'' and considering the sale of its oil and 
gas properties to raise cash for creditors.” Also 
announces that is in default on loans. 
Levitz 
Furniture Inc 




Statements made in annual report include 
warnings such as "may seriously jeopardize 
(Levitz's) ability to continue as a going 
concern," Auditor Arthur Anderson says Levitz 








An informal committee of bondholders informs 
the firm's board that they would not support the 
company's proposed exchange offer terms 
announced by the company on Feb. 4 and their 
belief that bondholder interests would be best 
served by the exercise of default remedies. 
Geneva Steel 
Company 




Announces that it planned to miss a $ 9 million 
interest payment due on Jan. 15 on some of its 
bonds in order to preserve the company's 








Differences between news types on distress- versus value loss date 
The following table contains the different dates for some of the bankrupt customers and their suppliers’ abnormal returns over these dates. 
Value Loss Date is that day of the year prior to filing on which the filing firm experiences the largest abnormal loss of shareholder wealth 
as measured by the abnormal percent return on the corresponding day multiplied by the market-capitalization from CRSP for the prior day. 
Distress Date is as described in text. Abnormal returns are computed using the market-adjusted returns method (Brown and Warner, 
1985), in which the daily abnormal return is the return of the firm less the CRSP value-weighted market return. The abnormal returns are 
cumulated for days -2 to +2 relative to the filing-, relevant- and distress- day, and daily abnormal returns are calculated using Market 
Adjusted Returns (MAR) with the CRSP value-weighted index as the market index.  Equal-weighted customer and supplier portfolios are 
formed from the individual customers and suppliers for each filing. 
 
Firm Filing date Value loss 
date 




























On 1 Dec announced a 




Announced that it hired 














On 29 Sept announced it 
would buy Natural 
Resources Geophysical 
Corp. valued at about $ 5 
million and this would 
cause assumption of $ 2 
million in debt.  
Announced that it had 
retained the investment 
banking firm of CIBC 
World Markets to serve 
as its financial advisor in 










Announced that it 
opened an additional 
luxury retirement 
community in Florida. 
Announced that it won't 
make interest payment 











Firm Filing date Value loss 
date 

















News on value loss date News on distress date 






Announced use of new 
machinery that would 
improve steel quality, 
productivity and yield 
higher casting speeds 
Announced that it will 
engage in asset sales 
to generate funds for  
debt reduction  
Braniff 
Inc 






Announced that it would 
buy 50 airbuses for 3.5 
billion and an option to 
buy 50 more 
Released a statement 
announcing indefinite 
flight cancellation. 






ns Inc  






On 8 Aug, Verizon and 
Northpoint came to an 
agreement to merge their 
DSL causing stocks of 
rivals such as Rhythms 
and Covad to fall as 
these were also suppliers 
to Verizon. 
Announced it hired 
Lazard Freres & Co. 
to evaluate a range of 
restructuring and its 
auditor had concluded 
that it would not have 
enough cash to 
continue operating 
through the following 
year. 




Table 1.4 continued 
 
Firm Filing date Value loss 
date 

















News on value loss date News on distress date 
Genuity 
Inc 






On 16 May announced a 
proposal for a reverse 




Verizon which had an 
option to acquire a 
controlling interest in 
Genuity informed that 
it had decided to 
relinquish the option. 
This caused a default.  
Southmark 
Corp 






 A jury found Southmark 
guilty of fraud in its 
purchase of Exchange 
Network ($130.9 million 
in damages) 
Southmark 
acknowledged that it 
may not have enough 
cash to meet operating 
and debt requirements  





















announced that they 
were partnering to 
launch the 
NeedBandwidth DSL 
Cente powered by 
NorthPoint and Netopia.  
Announced that it had 
revised its previously 
announced Q3 2000 
financial results and at 
the same time 
speculation arose 
among analysts that 
Verizon might 
renegotiate its $800 
million deal to buy 







Dollar value loss to suppliers of bankrupt customers over various dates 
The table below shows the median dollar loss over the distress-, filing-, and relevant-period to the 
suppliers of bankrupt firms. The dollar loss is computed as the abnormal percent return of the 5-
day trading period centered on the date multiplied by the market-capitalization from CRSP for 
third prior day. Abnormal returns are cumulated for the indicated windows relative to the filing- 
and distress-day, and are calculated using Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) with the CRSP value-
weighted index as the market index.  
 N Median Loss 
over distress 
period ($ mil) 
Median Loss over value 
loss period ($ mil) 
Median Loss 
over filing period 
($ mil) 
     
All suppliers for which all 
three dates exist 
133 -3.156 -2.410 -0.478 
     
All suppliers for which all 
three dates exist and distress 
date is not same as value loss 
date 





















Event Study results for suppliers and customers to bankrupt firms  
The following tables contain average cumulative filing-, distress-, relevant-period abnormal 
supplier and customer portfolio returns for the sample of filing firms. Customers of each filing 
firm in the prior 5 years are directly identified from FAS14 disclosures and any firm listing the 
filing firm as a customer in the 5 years prior to filing is labeled a supplier. FAS 14 disclosures are 
obtained from Compustat. Equal-weighted customer and supplier portfolios are formed from the 
individual customers and suppliers for each filing. Distress day is identified by searching the 
CRSP database over the year prior to the Chapter 11 filing date and finding the day on which the 
filing firm has the most negative dollar abnormal return. The abnormal returns are cumulated for 
days -2 to +2 relative to the filing- and distress- day, and daily abnormal returns are calculated 
using Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) with the CRSP value-weighted index as the market index. 
Standard errors are computed as described in Patell (1976). ***, **, or * indicates that the 
average is significantly different from zero (using a two-sided t-test) at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level 
(respectively).  
 Supplier Abnormal Returns Customer Abnormal Returns 
 Full sample 
 Distress period 
CAR (-2, +2) -6.93%*** -1.87%*** 
# of suppliers 231 222 
# of equally weighted portfolios 94 112 
 Chapter 11 filing period 
CAR (-2, +2) 0.18% 0.66%* 
# of suppliers 226 229 
# of equally weighted portfolios 95 119 
 Value loss period 
CAR (-2, +2) -1.65%*** -1.51%*** 
# of suppliers 232 (236) 

























                            FYE      FYE     FYE    FYE 
-----------│----------------│---------x----│---------F-----│--------- 
-3  -2  -1   0 
 
Figure 1.1 
Number line demonstrating dating convention used in study 
 
The number line below illustrates the dating convention.  The distress date is determined based on 
a news event within the 12 months prior to the Chapter 11 filing.  “FYE” indicates fiscal year 
ends relative to the filing date.  The filing date, F, occurs between time -1 and time 0.  The 
distress date occurs sometime between time” x” which is 12 months before the filing date, and the 
















































































































Stock price movements leading to Northpoint Communications’ Chapter 11 filing 
This shows the losses incurred by the filing firm (Northpoint Communications) in dollar value and the timing of the distress and value loss 
date. Dollar losses shown on the left y-axis are measured as the daily market adjusted abnormal return multiplied by the market 
capitalization of the previous day. CRSP value-weighted index is used for the market adjustment. The right y-axis measures the daily 
market capitalization of the filing firm. The first dashed line represents the dollar loss date, i.e., the date when the value of the dollar 
abnormal loss over the year prior to bankruptcy is maximum, whereas the second vertical dashed line represents the distress date found 
using hand-collected news articles. See Section 3 for details of distress date. 
                                                                                                
CHAPTER 2  
 
THE CROSS-SECTIONAL VARIATION IN SUPPLY  
CHAIN CONTAGION  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter examines the cross-sectional variation in the spillover effects of a 
firm’s distress on its upstream and downstream trading partners. Contagion in the supply 
chain is anecdotally well known. For instance, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
potential effects of General Motor’s (GM) bankruptcy on its suppliers were considered 
sufficiently serious for the federal government to authorize $5 billion out of the TARP 
funds to keep auto parts suppliers afloat. However, every supplier or customer of the 
distressed firm is not affected in the same way. Among the 49 suppliers to GM identified 
in this study, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)  over a 5-day period around the date 
of filing ranges from -17% to +24%. To date, literature has found evidence of supply 
chain contagion on average but there exists scant empirical evidence regarding the 
variation in the degree of contagion. In this study, I go beyond existing literature that 
documents average contagion effects by examining why some firms are affected more or 
less than others. By examining the cross-sectional variation in the wealth effects to 
upstream and downstream trading partners of distressed firms, I identify characteristics of 
both the filing firm and its trading partner which are important in explaining supply chain
37 
 
 contagion. Specifically, I address the following questions in this paper: How does the 
nature of distress (economic vs. financial) of the filing firm, the degree of product 
specialization, and the structure of the industry affect upstream and downstream 
contagion? Are the suppliers of a filing firm affected by their trade credit policy towards 
their distressed customer? How does the supplier operating performance change once its 
customer is in distress?  
I utilize the same sample of 215 firms and the corresponding sample of their 
suppliers and customers used in Chapter 1. These firms went bankrupt between 1981 and 
2009. In the first set of tests, I regress the 5-day CAR around the distress date on the 
potential drivers behind the flow of distress in the supply chain.1 The main hypothesis is 
that the implication for suppliers and customers will differ based on whether the filing 
firm is economically distressed or financially distressed. If a filing firm is in economic 
distress, it has a low operating profit and its value as a going concern is in doubt. This 
implies that economic distress of the filing firm is caused by an inability to repay debt 
due to a fundamentally flawed business model. As shown in Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjian 
(2009), an economically distressed filing firm has a lower probability of emerging from 
Chapter 11 as an independent firm when compared to a financially distressed filing firm, 
which is only overleveraged but does not have low operating profits. I classify each filing 
firm using the degree of economic versus financial distress and use this classification, 
along with other firm characteristics and a measure of industry distress, to estimate the 
filing firm’s probability of reorganization. In addition, I also test the hypothesis that 
                                                 
1 I hand-collect news articles to determine the distress date, which I define as the date on which relevant 
news about the distressed firm first arrived in the market. This reduces the noise level in CARs 
considerably, allowing me to find much more large-scale contagion effects than those documented in the 
literature to date. See Chapter 1 for details. 
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product characteristics such as the level of specialization and the industry competition 
structure affects the level of contagion.  
The first key finding is that, on average, suppliers of economically distressed 
firms experience much larger contagion effects compared to those firms which supply to 
purely financially distressed filing firms. Specifically, using distress dates defined in 
Chapter 1, I find that the suppliers to economically distressed filing firms experience 
negative abnormal returns equaling -8.3% (significant at the 5% level) over the 5-day 
distress period, whereas suppliers of financially distressed filing firms display 
insignificant effects (-0.7%) over the same period. 2  Extending the analysis to a 
multivariate setting, I find that when filing firms have a lower probability of successful 
reorganization, i.e., are relatively small in size, operate in distressed industries, and have 
a combination of low operating profits and low leverage, suppliers tend to experience 
negative returns on the distress date. In addition, suppliers which depend on their filing 
customer to generate a larger portion of their sales and which have higher product 
specialization have a higher level of contagion.  
Evaluating the wealth effects at zero probability of reorganization of the filing 
firm, I find that suppliers would experience abnormal returns equal to -19% over the 5-
day period. In contrast, suppliers to filing firms which are sure to reorganize successfully 
would have no negative stock price effects at all. This is an economically consequential 
finding. Overall, a 10% lower probability of reorganization would result in an average 
2% lower 5-day supplier CAR. This translates to each supplier losing an extra $2.5 
million on a median basis from its market capitalization over a 5-day period if its filing 
                                                 
2 These results are for equally weighted portfolios of suppliers for each bankrupt firm. Elsewhere, I also use 
sales-to-bankrupt-firm weighted portfolios. Results from the latter are stronger.  
39 
 
customer has a 10% lower chance of reorganizing successfully.3 Further, in the 
multivariate setting, customers of filing firms also experience significant contagion. The 
probability of reorganization is a significant predictor of customer wealth effects, though 
the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller compared to that for suppliers.4 The 
customer’s product specialization is the most important factor in explaining its abnormal 
returns when the supplier files.   
Since the empirical results show that the suppliers have more negative wealth 
effects than customers, I extend the analysis to study the operating performance of 
suppliers to filing firms. Operating profitability of suppliers deteriorates in the year of 
filing and the source of the drop can be traced to increased selling, general, and 
administration (SG&A) costs. This is consistent with suppliers facing fixed costs of 
switching to new customers. Suppliers may have to incur costs to tailor their products to 
particular customer such as costs of product adaptations, or time spent in training 
employees to operate new systems (Shapiro and Titman, 1985). I also find that the overall 
financial health of suppliers declines, as evidenced by a significant fall in the Altman z-
score in the 2 successive years after the customer files.  
This study contributes to the literature that studies indirect costs of bankruptcy. 
The cost of losing one’s suppliers or customers is often cited as one of the most important 
indirect costs of bankruptcy. Trading partners can take steps to safeguard their own 
financial position; for instance, Shapiro and Titman (1985) cite the example of Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., which filed for bankruptcy in April 1985. Its customers reduced 
                                                 
3 I arrive at this value by multiplying the coefficient of the likelihood that a sample firm is likely to 
reorganize by the median (mean) market capitalization of the supplier firm sample.  
4 In contrast to suppliers, customers of filing firms experience 0.4% decline in their 5-day CAR when the 
probability of reorganization drops by 10%. However, sample customers are much larger than the suppliers. 
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their orders, demanded discount prices on products, and changed their credit terms to 
cash-on-delivery. Instead of measuring the costs imposed on the filing firm, I focus on 
how the costs of distress spread upstream and downstream.  I show that firms can expect 
to be affected differently based on their product or industry characteristics as well as the 
probability of reorganization of their filing trading partner. This can have important 
implications for corporate policies at every level of the supply chain. Recent evidence in 
Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) indicates that firms may choose to vertically integrate 
along the supply chain when they face potential uncertainty in availability of inputs. 
Instead of operational risk management via vertical mergers, firms could also potentially 
design their hedging policies using derivatives to safeguard against potential supply chain 
disruptions.  
 This analysis also adds to the ongoing debate on whether distress costs that flow 
along the supply chain are important enough to justify bailouts of very large customers 
such as GM. In the wake of the auto industry’s distress, there was widespread concern 
that taxpayer’s dollars would be used to rescue firms that were distressed due to their 
own mismanagement or shifting customer demands. But at the same time, another major 
concern was that the effects should not spillover to its suppliers and cause a chain of 
bankruptcies (Rauh & Zingales, 2009). The debate is consequential given the magnitude 
of potential expenses involved on both sides. For instance, on December 11, 2008, Fitch 
Ratings declared that “In the event of a General Motors bankruptcy, Fitch believes that 
the resulting contraction in auto production, the supply chain, trade credit and capital-
access would cause widespread shutdowns and bankruptcies throughout the supply 
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chain”.5 On the other hand, estimates of the costs of the auto bailout are as high as $14 
billion.6 By identifying factors which can potentially quantify the costs of flow of distress 
to the filing firm’s suppliers, a quantitative assessment of whether funds should be 
allocated to supporting distressed firms is possible. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of the 
relevant literature and identifies relevant factors affecting supply chain contagion. 
Section 2.3 describes the set of explanatory variables. Section 2.4 presents the results of 
the analysis of suppliers, including their wealth effects and effects on trade receivables 
and operating performance. Section 2.5 describes the results of the analysis of the filing 
firm’s customers’ wealth effects. Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
2.2 Factors affecting supply chain contagion 
2.2.1 Probability of reorganization 
The probability that a filing firm emerges successfully from the Chapter 11 
process and remains a customer or supplier in the long run is likely to play a major role in 
determining supply chain wealth effects. Lemmon et al. (2009) show that one of the main 
determinants of the outcome of the Chapter 11 process is the type of distress faced by the 
filing firm. Financially distressed firms are overburdened with debt, but their underlying 
business model is sound. In contrast, economically distressed firms have very poor 
operating performance and, despite relatively low leverage, have difficulty repaying 
debts. The combination of poor performance and the inability to repay debt implies that 
such firms may not be viable at the current scale in the long run even if their leverage is 
                                                 




reduced. Lemmon et al. (2009) show that a financially distressed filing firm has a higher 
probability of emerging as a standalone entity from the Chapter 11 process compared to 
an economically distressed firm. Even if an economically distressed does survive, they 
show that recidivism in the first 3 years after emergence among economically distressed 
firms is three times as high as that among financially distressed firms.  
Overall, economically distressed firms have questionable going concern value and 
thus, questionable chances of remaining a trading partner to the supplier or customer. 
From a supplier or customer’s point of view, the present value of the cash flows forfeited 
is likely to be larger when the filing firm is economically distressed and hence, the 
contagion effect should be greater. I classify the sample of filing firms into economically 
distressed, mixed distressed (a combination of the two extreme types of distress), and 
financially distressed along the lines of Lemmon et al. (2009) to examine whether the 
wealth effects vary along these classifications.  
Apart from the distress type, firms which are larger in size also have a higher 
probability of emerging successfully from Chapter 11. Larger firms may be more difficult 
to acquire due to possible financing constraints of buyers and more difficult to sell or 
liquidate due to the larger asset fire sale costs (Aghion et al., 1992). Hertzel et al. (2008) 
find that the wealth effects on suppliers or customers are much stronger when the filing 
firm’s industry is also in distress. Suppliers and customers have greater difficulty in 
finding alternate trading partners if the entire industry is shrinking and the effects could 
be further magnified if the suppliers and customers have many trading partners in the 
filing firm’s industry. I use the method of Lemmon et al. (2009) to combine all the factors 
discussed above to estimate an overall probability of reorganization for each bankrupt 
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firm in the sample. I hypothesize that the probability of successful reorganization of the 
filing trading partner is an important determinant of the supply chain contagion. 
 
2.2.2 Other factors affecting suppliers and customers 
Potential losses to suppliers and customers rise with the degree of dependence on 
the filing firm. In addition to direct losses from lost sales or increased input prices, if the 
filing firm is economically important for its supplier or customer, it may exert bargaining 
power on its nonfiling trading partners before and during bankruptcy. Wilner (2000) 
presents a model in which dependent suppliers are forced to offer more concessions 
during Chapter 11 negotiations to the distressed customer if it wants to maintain an 
enduring product market relationship. A priori, I expect the degree of reliance to be 
economically significant in explaining the level of contagion. 
Firms selling (buying) specialized or unique goods to (from) the filing firm are 
likely to suffer negative wealth effects since such suppliers and customers are likely to 
have made more relationship-specific investments in the filing firm. Thus, sellers or 
buyers of nonspecific goods or services incur lower switching costs relative to those who 
buy or sell unique goods from the filing firm. Titman (1984) models such a situation 
where customers and suppliers of firms which produce unique goods anticipate greater 
spillover costs from distressed trading partners. He shows that such potentially higher 
switching costs lead to firms producing specialized goods to maintain lower leverage. 
Lower leverage implies lower costs of bankruptcy and less risk for the suppliers and 
customers and acts as an inducement for them to expend resources in relationship-
specific investments. Supporting this, Titman and Wessels (1988) find that their proxy for 
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uniqueness of goods produced (ratio of research and development expenditure to sales) is 
negatively related to a firm’s debt ratio. I hypothesize that if suppliers and customers sell 
or buy unique goods to the filing firm, supply chain contagion is higher for them. 
Following Titman and Wessels (1988), I use R&D expenditure as the measure of product 
specialization.  
I also expect that a supplier’s or a customer’s contagion in response to its 
partner’s distress will be affected by its own leverage. Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim 
(2008) show that both suppliers to, and customers of, firms operating in the durable 
goods industry maintain lower leverage as both have an incentive to present a low-risk 
image to their trading partners. Leverage magnifies the value of the equity relative to the 
total value of the firm and also increases the probability of distress in the supplier or 
customer, leading to higher bankruptcy costs. Opler and Titman (1994) find that highly 
leveraged firms lose greater market share to their more conservatively financed 
competitors during industry downturns. Lang and Stulz (1992) investigate the valuation 
effects of a bankruptcy announcement on the filing firm’s industry and find that rivals of 
the filing firm with higher leverage suffer greater contagion effects. Thus, the valuation 
effects of contagion due to the filing firm on its suppliers and customers are likely to be 
amplified in the presence of higher level of debt in the supplier or customer’s own capital 
structure.  
I investigate the effects of both the filing firm’s industry concentration and the 
supplier or customer’s own industry concentration. If a filing firm operating in a 
concentrated industry liquidates, its suppliers have fewer switching alternatives for 
rerouting their supply. In addition, the filing firm’s competitors have greater bargaining 
45 
 
power due to increased market share and may reduce input prices. If the filing firm 
survives, it may have greater bargaining power over the supplier during the negotiation 
process and can probably extract greater concessions since it is more difficult for the 
supplier to find a substitute customer.  
The effects of the filing firm’s concentration on its customers are more difficult to 
ascertain. As Hertzel et al. (2008) point out, shifting away of customer demand may drive 
the filing firm’s distress in the first place. In that case, as customers are the reason for the 
distress, they are unlikely to be affected by the filing firm’s industry concentration. But if 
customers face switching costs of finding other suppliers, surviving firms in the filing 
firm’s industry may collude to reduce output, leading to increased prices for the 
customer. This is more likely to happen when the filing firm’s industry concentration is 
higher and customers have fewer choices to reroute their purchases. Lang and Stulz 
(1992) also provide evidence that changes in market share due to Chapter 11 may lead to 
stock price effects, depending on the relative market shares of the firms in question. 
Examining the stock price effects on rivals to filing firms, they find that competing firms 
in industries which are more concentrated receive greater benefit from the removal of a 
competitor. They can earn higher rents by increasing prices when there is an increase in 
demand due to a competitor’s filing. The effects of contagion may increase with the 
market share of the supplier or customer of the filing firm if the supplier or customer was 






2.3 Data and variables 
I use the same sample of bankruptcies described in Chapter 1 and follow 
Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjian (2009) to classify each of the bankruptcies into financial-, 
economic- or mixed-type of distress. I sort bankrupt firms into deciles (within sample) 
and number them from zero to nine (zero being smallest and nine being largest) based on 
industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets averaged over the 2 years immediately preceding 
the filing year (year -3 and year -2) and repeat the same process using average leverage.7 
Industry adjustments to the EBITDA are made by subtracting the industry median 
EBITDA-to-total assets from the sample firms’ EBITDA-to-total assets. Industry 
medians are calculated based on 4-digit SIC codes provided that five or more firms reside 
in the industry, excluding the sample firm. If the 4-digit SIC code contains fewer than 
five firms, the industry median is defined using the 3-digit SIC code and I continue to the 
2-digit level until five firms are found. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets averaged over year -3 and year -2. The rankings are then 
summed, resulting in a combined rank from 0 to 18, with firms in categories 0-5 being 
economically distressed and firms in categories 14-18 financially distressed. Those in the 
middle are classified as having mixed distress.  
Table 2.1 shows distribution of distress type among filing firms by each decade. 
Across all three decades, 72% of all filing firms which have suppliers suffer from mixed 
distress, while the rest are equally divided into the financially and economically 
distressed groups. Correspondingly, 62% of all filing firms which have customers are in 
                                                 
7 Since the sample is relatively small, if I do not find data for the past 2 years, I take the last available year 
before bankruptcy. I average over years -3 and -2 relative to filing because I look for distress dates in the 
year immediately prior to filing. In order to ensure that the accounting data used to calculate the probability 
of reorganization were already known to the market on the distress date, I do not use data from the year 
immediately prior to filing. 
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the mixed distress category, with 26% of the remaining firms economically distressed 
and the remainder financially. It can be seen that the percentage of economically 
distressed filing firms increases in the 2000- 2009 period. I use the predicted probability 
of reorganization from a logistic model which uses the combined rank of the filing firm 
as the measure of the distress type and log of its assets as a proxy for firm size. In 
addition, the ratio of R&D expenses to assets of the filing firm is used as a measure of the 
manager’s information advantage in Chapter 11.  
I also use an industry distress indicator variable which is similar to that used in 
Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) and Lemmon et al. (2009) in the logistic 
regression. The industry median (based on 4-digit SIC code) stock return is calculated for 
the 12 months immediately prior to the Chapter 11 filing. If there are less than five firms 
in that 4-digit SIC code, I use the 3-digit (or, if required 2-digit) SIC code to calculate the 
industry median. Industries that have median return lower than -30% are identified as 
distressed with an “industry distress” indicator variable equal to one. The last input to the 
prediction model acts as a control for the effects of economic downturns. An indicator 
variable is set to one if the sample firm filed for bankruptcy in a year in which the percent 
change in GDP was in the bottom quartile of GDP changes over our sample period.  
For the nonfiling supplier and the nonfiling customer samples, I calculate their 
dependence on the filing firm by the dollar sales generated from the major customer of 
the reporting firm in the Compustat segment files (CSALE). When using CSALE to 
measure the degree of reliance of the suppliers on the filing firm, I normalize it by the 
supplier’s sales. To capture the percent of purchases made from the bankrupt firm by a 
customer, I divide CSALE by the nonfiling customer’s cost of goods sold. I measure this 
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variable for the year in which the match between the supplier-customer was made from 
the Compustat data.8 Publicly traded firms are required to report the identity of any 
customer that comprises more than 10% of a firm’s consolidated revenues along with the 
percentage of revenues generated, and if losing that customer would have a material 
adverse effect on the firm.9 Table 2.2 shows the characteristics of the filing firms, their 
suppliers, and their customers. Comparing Panels A and B, it is evident that customers 
are a lot larger than suppliers and less dependent on their filing trading partner since only 
suppliers are required to report their significant customers and not the other way around. 
Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) also document that customers reported in this data 
are larger compared to the supplier which implies these customers may be less 
constrained if their suppliers are distressed rather than vice versa.  This implies that 
effects on the customers may be limited.10  
Supplier and customer industry concentrations are measured using the Herfindahl 
index of all the firms having the same 4-digit SIC code as the customer or supplier in 
question. Following Fee and Thomas’s (2004) approach, I use binary variables to indicate 
that the supplier operates in a concentrated industry provided the Herfindahl Index is 
                                                 
8A potential concern is that the firms may not be related during the filing year. I cross check with a random 
sample of 10Ks and found that in each case, the relationship existed in the year of filing even if the 
Compustat match was made 5 years prior to the filing year. I do find that there is some variation in the 
percentage of sales generated by the major customer and some customers account for less than 10% of the 
sales in the filing year. In such cases, the measure of reliance will be larger than actual.  
9As per the SEC website, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-7549.htm, “since the adoption of SFAS 
No. 14, GAAP has required disclosure of revenues from major customers. SFAS No. 131 now (since 1997) 
requires issuers to disclose the amount of revenues from each external customer that amounts to 10 percent 
or more of its revenue as well as the identity of the segment(s) reporting the revenues. The accounting 
standards, however, have never required issuers to identify major customers. On the other hand, Regulation 
S-K Item 101 historically requires naming a major customer if sales to that customer equal 10 percent or 
more of the issuer’s consolidated revenues and if the loss of the customer would have a material adverse 
effect on the issuer and its subsidiaries. Since we continue to believe that the identity of major customers is 
material information to investors, we propose to retain this Regulation S-K requirement.”   
10 One potential concern about the filing firms and their suppliers/customers could be that both sides 
belong to the same industry.  I redo all tests after excluding any such observations from the regressions and 
find that results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
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greater than 2000. I use a similarly defined indicator if the customer operates in a 
concentrated industry. To measure operating profitability, EBITDA is divided by total 
assets and trade credit is measured by total trade receivables divided by total sales. For 
the trade payables, I scale payables by COGS instead of sales. To calculate an 
approximate measure of a supplier’s trade receivables generated from a particular filing 
customer, I multiply the percentage of sales generated by the filing customer by the trade 
receivables to sales ratio of the supplier. In order to measure the leverage of the supplier 
and the customer firms, I use the firm’s ratio of total liabilities to total asset. The supplier 
or customer’s R&D expenditure-to-asset ratio is used as a measure of product 
specialization. 11 All variables except reliance are calculated at the fiscal year end of the 
prefiling year (year -2) and at the fiscal year end of the year before that (year -1) and 
averaged. 
 The dependent variable in most of the regressions is the wealth effect of the filing 
firm’s distress on its trading partner measured by event study cumulative abnormal return 
for the supplier or the customer over a 5-day period centered around a date on which 
relevant economic information about the distressed partner is released to the market. 12 I 
follow the approach of Hertzel et al. (2008) and compute abnormal returns using the 
                                                 
11 R&D expenses to assets are being used as two different proxies: R&D to sales of the filing firm is used 
as a measure of the manager’s information advantage for the filing firms. I also use it later as a measure of 
the product specialization of the supplier or customer of the filing firm. While the results presented are 
from using R&D as a variable in our logit regression, I drop this variable as it is insignificant and redo all 
tests. Results remain virtually unchanged. Further, these two are not contradictory since product 
specialization implies uniqueness of goods produced in which situation managers would have more firm-
specific information than others. 
12 I present results for both individual suppliers or customers and also for portfolios formed for each 
bankrupt trading partner as individual firms contracting with the same filing firms may not be independent. 
I form portfolios of both the event study returns as well all our independent variables and the weights are 
equal to either CSALE/SALE for suppliers or CSALE/COGS for customers. The portfolios are formed 
such that customer weights in any customer portfolio would always add to one. Our results are qualitatively 
unchanged if we do not sum to one.  
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market-adjusted returns method (Brown and Warner, 1985), in which the daily abnormal 
return is the firm-specific return minus the value-weighted market return from CRSP.  
 
2.4 Empirical results for suppliers to bankrupt firms 
2.4.1 Abnormal returns to suppliers 
Table 2.3 presents the subsample results according to the distress type of the filing 
customers. For each filing, equal-weighted customer and supplier portfolios are formed.13 
As the distress type changes from financial to economic, the abnormal returns decrease in 
magnitude. The CAR for the 5-day distress period is a significant -8.30% for 
economically distressed firms whereas it is an insignificant -0.68% for financially 
distressed firms. The corresponding CARs for the value loss period are -2.72% and 
5.73% (both insignificant). The mixed type of distressed firms are in the middle with a 
significant -7.70% CAR (-4.50% during the value loss period, significant at 1% level). 
This provides preliminary evidence that suppliers to bankrupt firms which have a lower 
likelihood of emergence due to having low going concern values suffer a higher degree of 
contagion effects.  
 
2.4.2 Supplier multivariate results 
Table 2.4 presents the results from the logistic regression used to estimate the 
probability of reorganization of the filing firm.14 In both models, the dependent variable 
equals one if the Chapter 11 outcome is reorganization and zero if the outcome is 
liquidation or acquisition. Model 1 includes the combined rank measure of profitability 
                                                 
13 The average supplier and customer returns are the equal-weighted averages of these portfolio returns. 
14Three utilities drop out from the logistic regression (corresponding to eight suppliers) leaving a sample of 
filing firms corresponding to 320 suppliers instead of 328 
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and leverage to proxy for the degree of financial or economic distress, while Model 2 
breaks the combined rank measure into its two components. Consistent with the results in 
Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjian (2009), the combined rank variable is significant at the 1% 
level and larger firms are more likely to be reorganized rather than be liquidated or 
acquired. In contrast to Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjian (2009), firms in distressed industries 
are significantly less likely to reorganize. One reason for this could be that this sample 
starts from 1981 and includes filings in 2009, whereas theirs covers the period from 1991 
to 2004. In our subsequent tests, the predicted probability of reorganization is the main 
explanatory variable.  
Panel A of Table 2.5 shows the results of the OLS regression that explains 
individual supplier abnormal returns over customer distress and filing periods. All 
columns except (6) and (7) use abnormal returns measured over the distress period as the 
dependent variable.  Column (6) uses abnormal returns for the filing period CAR as the 
dependent variable. Column (7) uses portfolio returns instead of returns to individual 
suppliers. Since the suppliers to a particular filing customer are not independent, the t-
statistics presented are based on standard errors which control for industry and month of 
the year clustering.15  
The independent variable in column (1) is the predicted probability from Model 1 
in Table 2.4. The estimated coefficient on the probability of reorganization is positive and 
both economically and statistically significant. A 10% lower probability of reorganization 
is associated with a 2% drop in the CAR over the 5-day period. Multiplying the 
coefficient by the median market capitalization of the supplier firm sample translates to 
                                                 
15 Industry is defined as 2-digit SIC code. Month of the year is used so that all suppliers for a particular 
bankruptcy are clustered because the filing date is same for all.  
52 
 
an approximate loss of $2.5 million ($18 million mean) over 5-days for each firm. In fact, 
the model suggests that if the customer has a sufficiently high probability of reorganizing 
successfully, the supplier may not have any negative wealth effects. In column (2), I 
investigate the hypothesis that a higher level of supplier dependence on a bankrupt 
customer is associated with a greater loss in firm value. The estimated coefficient for the 
percentage of sales generated by the filing customer is strongly negative and significant. 
Together, the measures of reliance and probability of reorganization explain over 13% of 
the variation in abnormal returns.  
Column (3) adds the other independent variables which may have an impact on 
the abnormal returns.16 As discussed in Section 2.2.2, more leveraged suppliers are 
expected to have more negative abnormal returns.  However, while the coefficient is 
negative, it is not significant. The coefficient of R&D expenses over assets is significant 
and negative. This is consistent with the evidence in Titman and Wessels (1984) and 
Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008): a higher level of product specialization and the 
consequent higher level of relationship-specific investments in the trading relationship 
leads to greater costs of switching to a new partner. I do not find any evidence that the 
supplier industry concentration affects its abnormal returns. However, I find that if the 
filing customer operates in a more concentrated industry, suppliers have higher returns. 
The positive coefficient is inconsistent with the hypothesis that it is more difficult for a 
                                                 
16 If the suppliers are themselves operating in distressed industries, the negative wealth effects may be 
affected. In addition to the results tabulated and discussed here, I also add the indicator for the filing firm’s 
distress to the base specification (in addition to the probability of reorganization) and an analogously 
defined distress indicator for the nonfiling supplier’s industry. I find that, in addition to the probability of 
reorganization, the filing firm distress is significant (coefficient: -0.04) but does not reduce the coefficient 
on the prob. of reorg. significantly and does not lead to any significant increase in the adjusted R squared of 
the regression. The indicator for the supplier’s industry distress is insignificant and does not change the 
adjusted R squared of the regression. In addition, I also add the supplier’s (operating profit/assets X percent 
of sales from customers other than the filing firm)  to explore whether the supplier’s financial position can 
explain the wealth effects and find the variable insignificant 
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supplier to find a substitute customer in a more concentrated industry or that the filing 
firm’s competitors exert greater bargaining power due to increased market share and 
reduce input prices.  
Next, I examine whether the wealth effects on the supplier during its customer’s 
distress period can be explained by the supplier’s own outstanding trade receivables.  The 
loss to the supplier is equal to the losses due to past loans made to the filing customer (in 
the form of trade credit) plus the present value of future lost sales (switching costs). In 
performing the tests, I calculate a proxy for the percentage of trade receivables 
outstanding from the filing customer by multiplying the percentage of supplier’s sales 
generated from the filing customer by the supplier’s trade receivables to sales.  
This measure assumes that all sales made to the filing customer by the supplier 
are on credit. The results from adding this variable to the base model from column (3) in 
Table 2.5 is shown in columns (4) and (5) in Table 2.5.  In column (5), the original 
percentage of supplier’s sales to the filing customer is also included. This accounts for 
the portion of the loss that the supplier expects due to the probability of lower future cash 
flows due to lost sales.  As shown in column (5), the total receivables variable is negative 
and marginally significant, suggesting that higher amounts of receivables due from the 
filing customer are interpreted by the market as a negative sign. The coefficient of the 
total sales percent to the filing customer variable is now slightly smaller in magnitude 
compared to column (3) but is still significant. 
Column (6) uses the independent variables in the baseline model from column (3) 
to explain the abnormal returns over the filing period instead of the distress period. The 
results found are consistent with those described in Hertzel et al. (2008). In unreported 
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results, I also run a similar regression using the CARs from the value loss date and I find 
no significance for any of the variables except for the overall percentage of sales to the 
filing customer which is significantly negative. The adjusted R-squared from these 
regressions are much smaller than those found using the distress period abnormal returns, 
indicating that accurate measurement of the abnormal returns identifies contagion effects 
more effectively than in prior studies.  
Because the results for the suppliers of a particular customer are not independent, 
column (7) of Table 2.5 presents results for the base regression specification but uses a 
portfolio of suppliers to each filing firm as a single observation. The weighting for 
forming the portfolios of the returns as well as the independent variables is based on the 
quantity of sales a supplier makes to the customer relative to its total sales, reflecting the 
degree of reliance of the supplier on the filing customer. Similar to column (3), firms 
with a higher chance of reorganization suffer from much smaller contagion effects. I add 
the other variables in our base model to column (7) but find that although firms with 
higher R&D expenditures to assets and lower customer concentration have lower 
abnormal returns over the distress period, the coefficients are insignificant.  
In all the regressions discussed above, the supplier size, measured by its log of 
total assets, is included in case any of the other variables are acting as a proxy for the 
size. As can be seen in the results, supplier’s size is uniformly unimportant in all the 
columns.  
Panel B of Table 2.5 presents the results of a similar regression as in Panel A 
using subsamples of suppliers. In column (1), each filing firm which has five or more 
suppliers is included while column (2) presents the results obtained using only GM’s 
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suppliers in the regression. The rationale behind these regressions is that similar cross-
sectional characteristics should be important in this setup as in Panel A while controlling 
for the bankrupt firm itself. In column (1), I include dummies for each specific filing firm 
(15 in total) and the bankrupt-firm specific explanatory variables (probability of 
reorganization and customer industry concentration) are not included as independent 
variables. As can be seen from the results, the results mimic those obtained in Panel A 
using the full sample. Even with the reduced number of observations, the coefficients for 
the percentage of sales and R&D intensity of the supplier are negative and strongly 
significant. Column (2) reduces the sample much more drastically by including only 
suppliers to GM in the regression. Thirty-five supplier firms have the required data to be 
included in the regression and even in such a small sample, the results show the 
importance of percentage of sales as an explanatory variable for supplier contagion.  
To summarize, I find that the probability of reorganization by itself can explain 
about 7% of the variation in the supplier abnormal returns over the relevant period. If I 
add the degree of reliance of the supplier on the customer, an extra 6% explanatory power 
is added. Together with the level of product specialization and the degree of 
concentration of the filing customer’s industry, these are strong predictors of the degree 
of supplier contagion.  
 
2.4.3 Long run event study results 
In Table 2.6, I check the robustness of the results by implementing a buy and hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR)-based methodology (Barber and Lyon, 1997) to calculate the 
abnormal returns for suppliers. To find a matching firm for each supplier, the firm that 
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has the following characteristics is chosen: the match firm has the closest (but larger) 
market capitalization to the supplier in the year before filing, belongs to the same 
exchange, and has the same 2-digit SIC code. If the best matching firm does not have 
data for the event period, I replace it with the next best market-capitalization-based 
match. If the supplier happens to be the largest in its group, I use the second largest firm 
as the match. BHAR is calculated over 6-month and 3-month period prior to the filing 
date and the results are shown in Table 2.6.17 As can be seen, only the 3-month individual 
supplier regression in column (1) has a significant F statistic and the regressions get 
noisier if we extend the time over which we base our event study or if we form portfolios. 
The probability of reorganization is strongly significant in these individual supplier-based 
regressions. The degree of reliance of the supplier has the expected negative coefficient 
but is not significant.  
 
2.4.4 Operating performance of suppliers 
 In this section, I examine how the supplier operating performance is affected by 
the filing firm’s distress. To calculate performance changes, I use a matched firm 
adjustment approach as in Barber and Lyon (1996) and Fee and Thomas (2004). Each 
supplier to a filing firm is matched with a control firm chosen on the basis of industry, 
asset size, and operating performance in the prefiling year. Starting with the entire 
universe of Compustat firms, all bankrupt firms and their suppliers and customers are 
eliminated. From the remaining firms, those in the same 2-digit SIC code and with asset 
size at the end of the year prior to bankruptcy between 25% to 200% of the supplier and 
                                                 
17 The mean number of days between the distress date and filing date is 170 for all bankrupt firms which 
have at least one or more suppliers. 
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operating profit percentage between 90% to 110%  of the supplier are identified. From 
the set of these possible matches, the one closest in operating performance to the supplier 
is chosen. If matches are not found at this stage, the industry screen is relaxed to a 1-digit 
SIC match requirement. At the next stage, the industry matching requirement is removed 
and matches are made only on the basis of asset size and performance. If I am still left 
with no match, I use the operating performance matching only at the last stage. If the 
match firm drops out, it is replaced with the next best available match. There is attrition 
in the sample each year as not all suppliers have more than one match using the most 
relaxed matching criteria and not all suppliers have data for all years on Compustat.18 I 
am able to find 194 supplier-match firm pairs by this process in the year prior to customer 
bankruptcy.19 I follow the performance of the entire sample of suppliers relative to that of 
their matching firm from the year prior to filing to 3 years after filing. The aim is to 
investigate whether supplier contagion can be attributed to loss of sales, increased costs, 
or overall declining margins.  
Panel A of Table 2.7 presents the results in the form of differences between two 
successive years. The change in supplier sales and COGS that occurs from the year end 
before filing (time -1) to the fiscal year end after filing (year 0) year is insignificant. This 
could be so because many filing firms continue to operate as usual while under 
bankruptcy protection.20 I find that SG&A costs of suppliers increase significantly in the 
                                                 
18 As a check for survivorship bias in the results for this section, I fix all firms that have data in year +3 
after the filing (varies from 76 to 61 depending on the particular variable) and redo the tests. While 
significance is diminished in these tests, the trends remain same.  
19 Out of the 194 matches, 157 are formed using two digit industry, size, and profit matching. Twenty-
seven are formed using one digit industry matching, size, and profit matching while 10 are formed on the 
basis of size and performance only. 
20 To ascertain whether the results are driven by the denominator of the operating ratios instead of the 
numerators, I test whether the gross sales and total assets change significantly between year -1 and year 0. I 
find that total asset does not change significantly. Gross sales remain unchanged on a mean basis but on a 
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filing year and correspondingly, a significant 2% median (6% mean) decline in operating 
profitability is observed. Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) find that those suppliers who 
are in long-term relationships with their customer spend less on SG&A due to lower 
service costs, higher repeat sales, and higher overall effectiveness of selling expenditures. 
Taken together with these results, the evidence suggests that the distress of the filing firm 
may lead to an erosion (or at least a temporary disruption) of the supplier’s combined 
efficiencies in reducing selling expenses. In addition, if the filing firm liquidates, 
suppliers have to search for and switch to new customers. There is also evidence of an 
overall worsening of the financial health of the suppliers from the Altman z-score 
measure which declines significantly (on a median basis) in the year of filing and 
continues to decline significantly in the year after filing as well. Along with the z-scores, 
the significant change in gross margins in the following year is also consistent with the 
suppliers being forced to change to new customers.21 22 
I examine the changes in operating profits across various subsamples (results not 
tabulated) and find that when divided according to the degree of reliance, suppliers which 
generate over 10% of their sales from the filing customer experience a significant drop in 
filing year operating profit while the drop is insignificant for the nonreliant sample. I also 
                                                                                                                                                 
median basis, there is a drop in sales of $0.06 million which is significant at 5% level. Since the gross profit 
margin is the only ratio in which I use gross sales as the denominator, I redo this ratio using total assets as 
the denominator instead of the gross sales and find that the results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
21 Another possible reason for suppliers’ rising SG&A in the year of filing could be provisions for doubtful 
debts, which is the current period expense associated with losses from credit sales and which may be 
included as part of SG&A expenses. This in turn could imply that uncollected accounts receivables may be 
responsible for the immediate changes in operating performance rather than lost sales or changed 
production processes. 
22 I also calculate the results from using the change in operating profit of the supplier as the dependent 
variable while using the same set of independent variables as in Table 2.5. I verify that the losses are 
proportional to the probability of reorganization of the firm and find that the coefficient of the prob. of 




examine whether suppliers operating in durable goods industry suffer more than those 
operating in nondurable goods industry. Banerjee et al. (2008) show that firms operating 
in durable goods industry make (and need their trading partners to make) more 
relationship-specific investments due to the nature of the goods in which they transact. 
Consistent with their results, I find that suppliers operating in durable goods industry 
experience larger and more significant drops in operating profit in the year of their 
customer’s filing.  
 
2.5 Empirical results for customers to bankrupt firms 
In this section, I examine the wealth effects of the filing firm’s distress on its 
customers. Panel B of Table 2.3 shows event study results using equally weighted 
customer portfolios around the 5-day period surrounding the distress date and the filing 
date. The overall customer sample has significant negative returns (-1.87% significant at 
the 1% level) around the distress date. While the effect is weaker relative to the supplier 
group (shown in Panel A), it is economically significant.  
Customers may in fact cause the financial distress of their filing supplier firms by 
moving their demand away from these suppliers. If this is the case, then they are unlikely 
to be affected by the distress type of their supplier. As can be seen from the results in 
Panel B of Table 2.3, there is no clear ordering with respect to the distress type of the 
filing firm. The significant results in the mixed distress group could arise due to the 
relatively large sample size when compared to that of economically and financially 
distressed firms. Further, as detailed in Chapter 1, for any customer-supplier relationship, 
the supplier must be in the Compustat segment database. This implies that while the 
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supplier is reliant on the customer, the customers need not be reliant on the suppliers. 23  
As shown in Table 2.2, suppliers account for only 2% (mean) and 0.2% (median) of the 
purchases made by the customers. Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2010) find that suppliers who 
disclose their non-major customers in this data have a higher propensity to release the 
identity of those customers which are superior performers in their industry.24 These 
factors imply that wealth effects in customers at the time of the filing firm’s distress may 
be harder to detect in the data.  
Table 2.8 reports the results from the OLS regressions using the abnormal returns 
from the distress period and the filing period. columns (1) and (2) present results for 
individual customers while column (3) presents the results for purchases/COGS weighted 
portfolios of customers, where each portfolio is based on all identified customers of a 
given bankrupt supplier firm. Column (4) presents results for individual customers using 
the abnormal return over the filing period. The probability of the filing firm’s 
reorganization has a relatively smaller role in explaining the abnormal returns of 
customers when compared to the suppliers, although it is still significant. The level of 
product specialization measured by R&D expenditure and the degree of reliance are more 
important for downstream contagion.  
When compared to the effects on suppliers to filing firms, the importance of 
reliance is diminished but the importance of R&D expenses is magnified. Switching costs 
due to product specialization turns out to be one of the main drivers of the wealth effects 
on the customer. Customers who are not reliant on the filing suppliers in terms of their 
                                                 
23 This implies that suppliers to filing firms are, by construction, dependent on the filing firm. But 
customers to filing firms are not necessarily dependent on them. As the sample statistics for the sample of 
customers in Table 2.1 shows, the median purchases from filing supplier firms is about 0.2% of purchases 
made by the customer.  
24 Performance measured by ROA. 
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percentage of purchases may still be technologically dependent on their suppliers. This 
result is especially interesting in light of the findings of Ellis et al. (2010) that customers 
with lower R&D expenses are reported in this sample to reduce loss of proprietary 
information —this implies that product specialization may be even more important than 
what these results suggest. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 I analyze the upstream and downstream flow of contagion when a firm is in distress 
and files for reorganization under Chapter 11. Specifically, I examine the cross-sectional 
factors that are important in such flow of distress. Examining whether the distress type of the 
filing firm is associated with the level of contagion, I find that suppliers to economically 
distressed firms have significantly more negative stock price effects than those to financially 
distressed firms do. This is consistent with the idea that a financially distressed firm can be 
viable if it reduces leverage whereas an economically distressed firm may not be viable as a 
going concern even with leverage reduction. In the multivariate tests, I find that the 
probability of emergence from Chapter 11, the degree of reliance, and level of product 
specialization are important for ascertaining the wealth effects of suppliers and customers. I 
further analyze suppliers’ operating performance during and after the Chapter 11 filing of its 
major customer. I find that SG&A increases, operating profits decline, and Altman z-score 
decreases. This is consistent with deterioration in the overall financial health of the supplier 







Sample statistics of Chapter 11 filing firms 
Panel A: Distribution of distress type of Chapter 11 filings by decade 
 
Filing firms are grouped into distress types using the combined rank measure. Combined rank is 
constructed in a similar fashion as in Lemmon et al. (2009) by 1) averaging the filing firm’s year 
-3 and year -2 industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets and ranking this into deciles among all filing 
firms in the sample, 2) averaging each filing firm’s year -3 and year -2 leverage and ranking this 
into deciles among all filing firms in the sample, and 3) summing the two decile rankings. 
Industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets is the average of the filing firm’s year -3 and -2 EBITDA-
to-total assets minus the industry median EBITDA-to-total assets. The industry is defined at the 
4-digit SIC level provided that it contains a minimum of five firms. Otherwise, the industry is 
defined at the 3-digit or 2-digit SIC level. Leverage is measured as average of total liabilities to 
total assets at year -3 and -2. Firms with combined rank of 0 to 5 are classified as economically 
distressed and those with combined rank between 14-18 are financially distressed. The 
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35 54 10 10 77 13 
1990-
1999 
22 59 18 14 76 11 
2000-
2009 
21 71 8 20 63 17 
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Table 2.1 continued 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of filing firms and their suppliers and customers 
 
Combined rank is constructed similarly to Lemmon et al. (2009) by 1) averaging the firm’s year -
3 and year -2 industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets and ranking this into deciles among all 
Chapter 11 sample firms, 2) averaging the firm’s year -3 and year -2 leverage and ranking this 
into deciles among all Chapter 11 sample firms, and 3) summing these two decile rankings. 
Industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets is the average of the sample firm’s year -3 and -2 EBITDA-
to-total assets minus the industry median EBITDA-to-total assets where both years are available. 
The industry is defined at the 4-digit SIC level provided that it contains a minimum of five firms. 
Otherwise, the industry is defined at the 3-digit or 2-digit SIC level. Leverage is measured as 
average of total liabilities-total assets at year -3 and -2. R&D-to-assets is the average of the ratio 
of research and development expense to total assets. Firm Size is the value of total assets 
averaged across year -3 and -2. Industry Concentration is the average Herfindahl index calculated 
using all the firms in the same 4 digit SIC code over year -3 and year -2. Trade Receivables are 
scaled by sales and averaged across years -3 and -2 while Trade Payables are scaled by cost of 
goods sold and averaged across years -3 and -2.  
Variable N Mean Median 
Combined rank 215 8.72 8.00 
R&D intensity 215 0.011 0.00 
Leverage (Total liabilities/ Total assets) 215 0.79 0.76 
Industry concentration 215 0.22 0.18 
Industry adjusted EBITDA/ Total Assets 215 -0.02 -0.01 
Filing firm size ($ millions) 215 1002 781 
Trade receivables/ Sales 209 0.22 0.15 
















Descriptive statistics of suppliers and customers 
Panel A: Sample Statistics of Suppliers 
Results are presented using the number of firms for which the data are available for that variable. 
Percentage of sales is the sales made from the bankrupt customer in the year in which the 
relationship is identified between the firms scaled by the total sales of the supplier in that year. 
Supplier size is the total assets of the firm averaged across year -2 and -1 relative to filing. 
Leverage is measured as average of total liabilities-total assets at year -2 and -1 relative to filing. 
Operating earnings to total assets is supplier EBITDA scaled by total assets and averaged over 
year -2 and year -1 relative to filing. Supplier trade receivables and payables are scaled by sales 
and cost of goods sold, respectively, and averaged across years -2 and -1 relative to filing. R&D 
intensity is supplier R&D expense/Total Assets averaged over year -2 and -1 relative to filing. 
Industry concentration is the Herfindahl index calculated using all the firms in the same 4 digit 
























Variable N Mean Median 
Percentage of sales generated from bankrupt trading partner 313 14.5 11.0 
Supplier size ($ millions) 289 89 117 
Supplier leverage (Total liabilities/ Total assets) 288 0.76 0.52 
Supplier operating earnings-to-assets 279 -0.03 0.08 
Supplier total receivables-to-total sales 277 0.22 0.16 
Supplier total payables-to-total COGS 286 0.32 0.14 
Supplier R&D intensity 320 0.05 0.00 
Supplier industry concentration 290 0.21 0.15 
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Table 2.2 continued 
Panel B: Sample Statistics of Customers 
 
Results are presented using the number of firms for which the data are available for that variable. 
Percentage of purchases is the purchases made from the bankrupt supplier in the year in which the 
relationship is identified between the firms scaled by the total cost of goods sold of the customer 
in that year. Customer size is the total assets of the firm averaged across year -2 and -1 relative to 
filing. Leverage is measured as average of total liabilities-total assets at year -2 and -1 relative to 
filing. Operating earnings to total assets is customer EBITDA scaled by total assets and averaged 
over year -2 and year -1 relative to filing. Customer trade receivables and payables are scaled by 
sales and cost of goods sold respectively and averaged across years -2 and -1 relative to filing. 
R&D intensity is customer R&D expense/Total Assets averaged over year -2 and -1 relative to 
filing. Industry concentration is the Herfindahl index calculated using all the firms in the same 4 
digit SIC code as the customer. 
 Variable N Mean Median 
Percentage of purchases made from bankrupt trading partner 248 2.4% 0.2% 
Customer size ($ millions) 251 21569 28085 
Customer leverage (Total liabilities/ Total assets) 251 0.68 0.66 
Customer operating earnings-to-assets 248 0.11 0.11 
Customer total receivables-to-total sales 240 0.27 0.14 
Customer total payables-to-total COGS 248 0.53 0.14 
Customer R&D to total assets 277 0.03 0.003 





























Supplier and customer abnormal returns over different distress types 
The following tables contain average cumulative filing- and distress-period supplier and customer 
abnormal portfolio returns. Supplier and their customers are identified from firms reporting major 
customers in Compustat segment data. Any firm listing a filing firm as a customer in the 5 years 
prior to filing is labeled a supplier and vice versa. Equal-weighted customer and supplier 
portfolios are formed from the individual customers and suppliers for each filing. Distress day is 
identified as described in Section 3. Suppliers and customers are grouped into distress type using 
the Combined Rank measure. Combined rank is constructed similarly to Lemmon et al. (2009) by 
1) averaging the firm’s year -3 and year -2 industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets and ranking this 
into deciles among all Chapter 11 sample firms, 2) averaging the firm’s year -3 and year -2 
leverage and ranking this into deciles among all Chapter 11 sample firms, and 3) summing these 
two decile rankings. Industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets is the average of the sample firm’s year 
-3 and -2 EBITDA-to-total assets minus the industry median EBITDA-to-total assets. Industry is 
defined at the 4-digit SIC level provided that it contains a minimum of five firms. Otherwise, the 
industry is defined at the 3-digit or 2-digit SIC level. Leverage is measured as average of total 
liabilities-total assets at year -3 and -2. Firms with combined rank of 0 upto 5 are classified as 
economically distressed and those with the measure between 14-18 are financially distressed. The 
remainders (6-13) are classified as mixed distressed firms. The abnormal returns are cumulated 
for days -2 to +2 relative to the filing- and distress- day, and daily abnormal returns are calculated 
using Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) with the CRSP value-weighted index as the market index. 
Standard errors are computed as described in Patell (1976). ***, **, or * indicates that the 
average is significantly different from zero (using a two-sided t-test) at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level 
(respectively).  
 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns for Suppliers 
 
Supplier Abnormal Returns 











 Distress period 
CAR (-2, +2) -6.93%*** -8.26%** -7.74%*** -0.68% 
# of suppliers 231 30 151 50 
# of equally weighted 
portfolios 
94 16 66 12 
 Chapter 11 filing period 
CAR (-2, +2) 0.18% 2.59% -0.02% -2.26% 
# of suppliers 226 30 150 46 
# of equally weighted 
portfolios 








Table 2.3 continued 
Panel B: Abnormal Returns for Customers 
 
Customer Abnormal Returns 










 Distress period 
CAR (-2, +2) -1.87%*** -1.47% -2.18%*** -0.98% 
# of customers (222) (40) (155) (27) 
# of equally weighted 
portfolios 
(112) (25) (73) (14) 
 Chapter 11 filing period 
CAR (-2, +2) 0.66%* 2.50%** -0.09% 1.63% 
# of customers (229) (40) (161) (28) 
# of equally weighted 
portfolios 

































Logistic regressions for probability of reorganization in Chapter 11 
Columns 1 and 2 present the results from binomial logistic regressions where the dependent 
variable equals zero if the outcome of Chapter 11 is either liquidation or acquisition and equals 
one if the outcome is reorganization. Combined rank is constructed similarly to Lemmon et al. 
(2009) by 1) averaging the firm’s year -3 and year -2 industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets and 
ranking this into deciles among all Chapter 11 sample firms, 2) averaging the firm’s year -3 and 
year -2 leverage and ranking this into deciles among all Chapter 11 sample firms, and 3) 
summing these two decile rankings. Industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets is the average of the 
sample firm’s year -3 and -2 EBITDA-to-total assets minus the industry median EBITDA-to-total 
assets. Industry is defined at the 4-digit SIC level provided that it contains a minimum of five 
firms. Otherwise, the industry is defined at the 3-digit or 2-digit SIC level. Leverage is measured 
as average of total liabilities-total assets at year -3 and -2. Industry distress is an indicator variable 
that equals one if stock return of the median firm in the industry is less than -30% in the 12 
months immediately prior to Chapter 11 filing. Low GDP quartile equals one if the firm filed for 
Chapter 11 in any of the years that comprise the lowest quartile of GDP growth over our sample 
period. R&D-to-assets is the ratio of research and development expense to total assets and is 
averaged over year -3 and -2 prior to filing. Industry dummy variables are based on Fama and 
French’s specification of 12 industries. The z-statistics for individual coefficients are reported in 
parentheses. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 





Intercept -2.7326 -3.1775 
(-2.70)*** (-2.87)*** 
Pre filing industry adjusted EBITDA to TA  1.2252 
(0.68) 
Pre filing Leverage  1.6400 
(2.14)** 
Combined rank 0.1104  
(2.62)*** 
Log of total assets 0.3814 0.3956 
(2.80)*** (2.89)*** 
Industry distress -0.8978 -0.8121 
(-2.52)*** (-2.28)** 
Low GDP quartile 0.2373 0.2034 
(0.47) (0.41) 
R&D to assets -0.9425 -0.7174 
(-0.23) (-0.16) 
Industry dummy variables yes yes 
Observations 212 212 







Supplier multivariate regressions 
Panel A: OLS regressions for the CAR during various periods for suppliers 
 
The dependent variable in Models 1 through 6 is the suppliers’ abnormal cumulated return for days -2 to +2 relative to the distress- or 
filing-date of the bankrupt (customer) firm and is calculated using Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) with the CRSP value-weighted index 
as the market index. In column 7, for each bankrupt customer, all the suppliers are formed into portfolios with the weight equal to the sales 
to bankrupt customer/ total sales of supplier. Leverage is calculated as average of the supplier’s total liabilities-to-total assets at year -1 
and -2 relative to filing. R&D intensity is R&D expenses/ Total Assets for each supplier calculated as average of R&D expenses-to-total 
assets at year -1 and -2 relative to filing. Industry concentration is the Herfindahl indexes calculated for each filing firm or supplier firm 
using all the firms in the same 4 digit SIC code. Probability of reorganization is taken from the predicted values of the logistic regression 
presented in Table 4 and uses combined rank from Model 1. The percentage of sales is supplier sales generated from the filing firm in the 
year in which the relationship is identified between the firms scaled by the total sales of the supplier in that year. Supplier receivables from 
the bankrupt customer are estimated by multiplying the percentage of supplier’s sales generated by the filing customer by the average 
trade receivables in year -2 and year -1 relative to filing. The t-statistics reported in parentheses control for supplier industry and month of 
the year clustering effects. “*”,“**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAR over (-2, +2) for individual suppliers over: CAR over (-2, +2) 
for portfolios of 
suppliers over: 
  Distress 
Date        
(1) 
Distress Date   
(2) 
Distress Date         
(3) 
Distress Date    
(4) 
Distress Date   
(5) 
Chapter 11 Filing 
Date              
(6) 
Distress Date        
(7) 
Intercept -0.1928 -0.1647 -0.1390 -0.1424 -0.1815 0.0429 -0.2831 
(-4.09)*** (-3.64)*** (-3.13)*** (-3.06)*** (-3.66)*** (0.93) (-8.26)*** 
Supplier Leverage   -0.0089 -0.0147 -0.0219 -0.0275 0.0316 
  (-0.26) (-0.42) (-0.59) (-0.62) (1.67)* 
Supplier R&D Intensity   -0.1332 -0.1377 -0.1620 0.1810 -0.0114 
  (-2.14)** (-2.24)** (-2.12)** (1.62) (-0.11) 
Supplier Industry  
Herfindahl Index> 2000 
  -0.0094 -0.0065 0.0006 0.0080 0.0287 
  (-0.60) (-0.38) (0.04) (0.61) (1.02) 
Customer Industry  
Herfindahl Index> 2000 
  0.0329 0.0324 0.0410 -0.0184 0.0513 




Table 2.5 continued 




  Distress Date    
(1) 
Distress 
Date         
(2) 
Distress Date     
(3) 
Distress Date     
(4) 
Distress Date      
(5) 
Chapter 11 Filing 
Date              
(6) 
Distress Date     
(7) 
Customer Probability of 
Reorganization 
0.1944 0.2095 0.2259 0.2256 0.2128 -0.0215 0.2709 
(3.30)*** (3.71)*** (4.38)*** (4.24)*** (3.96)*** (-0.41) (3.48)*** 
Supplier Size   -0.0068 -0.0064 -0.0031 -0.0215 -0.0009 
  (-1.67)* (-1.48) (-0.74) (-0.42) (-0.15) 
Percent of Sales from 
Bankrupt customer 
 -0.2647 -0.2597 -0.2213  -0.0837  
 (-7.11)*** (-5.94)*** (-3.40)***  (-1.10)  
Supplier receivables  from 
bankrupt customer 
   -0.0499 -0.0918   
   (-1.85)* (-6.28)***   
# of observations 227 222 222 212 212 217 87 
P value of F statistic  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 0.1848 0.0012 






Table 2.5 continued 
Panel B: OLS regressions for the CAR for suppliers subsamples 
The dependent variable in Models 1 through 6 is the suppliers’ abnormal cumulated return for 
days -2 to +2 relative to the distress- or filing-date of the bankrupt (customer) firm and is 
calculated using Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) with the CRSP value-weighted index as the 
market index. In column 7, for each bankrupt customer, all the suppliers are formed into 
portfolios with the weight equal to the sales to bankrupt customer/ total sales of supplier. 
Leverage is calculated as average of the supplier’s total liabilities-to-total assets at year -1 and -2 
relative to filing. R&D intensity is R&D expenses/ Total Assets for each supplier calculated as 
average of R&D expenses-to-total assets at year -1 and -2 relative to filing. Industry 
concentration is the Herfindahl indexes calculated for each filing firm or supplier firm using all 
the firms in the same 4 digit SIC code. Probability of reorganization is taken from the predicted 
values of the logistic regression presented in Table 4 and uses combined rank from Model 1. The 
percentage of sales is supplier sales generated from the filing firm in the year in which the 
relationship is identified between the firms scaled by the total sales of the supplier in that year. 
Supplier receivables from the bankrupt customer are estimated by multiplying the percentage of 
supplier’s sales generated by the filing customer by the average trade receivables in year -2 and 
year -1 relative to filing. The t-statistics reported in parentheses control for supplier industry and 
month of the year clustering effects. “*”,“**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAR over (-2, +2) for individual suppliers over distress date 
  All firms with 5 or more 
suppliers                  
(1) 
General Motors (Clustered Std Error 
only by industry of supplier)             
(2) 
Intercept 0.0629 0.1870 
(3.34)*** (1.17) 
Supplier Leverage 0.0069 0.1613 
(0.11) (1.99)** 
Supplier R&D Intensity -0.3099 -0.3819 
(-5.36)*** (-0.51) 
Supplier Industry  
Herfindahl Index> 2000 
-0.0289 -0.0863 
(-1.13) (-1.74) 




Supplier Log (Total Assets) -0.0068 -0.0281 
 (-1.14) (-2.06)** 
# of observations 116 35 
P value of F statistic 0.0761 0.2313 














OLS regressions for the BHAR during various periods for suppliers 
The dependent variable in models 1 through 4 is the buy and hold abnormal cumulated return for 
the months specified and are calculated following the Barber & Lyon (1997) method using a 
matched firm with the closest market capitalization and with the same exchange and 2 digit SIC 
code. Leverage is calculated as average of the supplier’s total liabilities-to-total assets at year -1 
and -2 relative to filing. R&D intensity is R&D expenses/ Total Assets for each supplier 
calculated as average of R&D expenses-to-total assets at year -1 and -2 relative to filing. Industry 
concentration is the Herfindahl indexes calculated for each filing firm or supplier firm using all 
the firms in the same 4 digit SIC code. Probability of reorganization is taken from the predicted 
values of the logistic regression presented in Table 4 and uses combined rank from Model 1. The 
percentage of sales is supplier sales generated from the filing firm in the year in which the 
relationship is identified between the firms scaled by the total sales of the supplier in that year. 
The t-statistics reported in parentheses control for supplier industry and month of the year 
clustering effects if individual suppliers are used and only for month of the year clustering effects 
if supplier portfolios are used. “*”,“**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable BHAR over three months prior to 
customer filing 
BHAR over six months prior to 
customer filing 
  Individual 
supplier         
(1) 
Sales to customer 
weighted portfolios      
(2) 
Individual 





portfolios        
(4) 
Intercept -0.6797 -0.3272 -1.1403 -1.0825 
(-3.15)*** (-2.97)*** (-2.31)** (-3.34)*** 
Supplier leverage 0.0973 -0.2395 0.1577 -0.1233 
(0.32) (-1.50) (0.82) (-0.29) 
Supplier R&D intensity 0.2588 -0.0041 0.0547 0.7326 
(0.87) (-0.02) (0.05) (1.57) 
Supplier industry  
Herfindahl Index> 2000 
-0.0577 -0.1943 -0.0034 0.2073 
(-0.59) (-1.51) (-0.04) (0.30) 
Filing firm probability of 
reorganization 
0.8169 0.4344 0.8888 0.8625 
(3.41)*** (1.77)* (2.08)** (2.09)** 
Percent of sales from filing 
customer 
-0.2114  -0.1509  
(-0.68)  (-0.44)  
Filing customer industry  
Herfindahl Index> 2000 
-0.0010 0.0241 0.2146 0.2618 
(-0.01) (0.30) (1.20) (1.85)* 
# of observations 217 88 214 86 
P value of F statistic 0.0211 0.2535 0.1127 0.3054 








Operating performance of suppliers 
This table presents the matched firm-adjusted measures of operating performance for suppliers to filing firms. Each value is a difference 
found by subtracting the variable value of the corresponding matching firms. Matching firms are calculated using the Barber and Lyon 
(1996) method by choosing those matched firms which are closest to each sample supplier firm by industry (2 digit SIC code), size (50%-
150% of sales) and past performance (measured as ROA in the year -1 prior to bankruptcy announcement).  (Year n – Year n-1) difference 
of each measure is the difference between the values in the corresponding years. Year 0 is the year of bankruptcy announcement (see 
definition of timing convention in Section 3). Operating Profit is defined as the EBITDA while Altman Z score is equal to (3.3*Operating 
Earnings + 1.0*Sales + 1.4*Retained Earnings +1.2*Working Capital)/Total Assets. The p values reported in parentheses are calculated 
from t tests for the means and from Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests for the medians. “*”,“**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
  Sales/Assets  COGS/Assets Gross profit/Sales 
 # obs Mean Median # obs Mean Median #  obs Mean Median 
Value in year -1 194 -0.0914 0.0744 194 -0.0776 0.0464 194 -0.0139 0.0024 
Change from year -1 to year 0 173 0.0896 -0.0097 173 0.1155 0.0025 173 -0.0260 -0.0070 
p value (t test for means and 
Wilcoxon rank sum test for medians) 
 (0.53) (0.20)  (0.40) (0.38)  (0.19) (0.16) 
Change from year  0 to year 1 122 -0.5714 -0.0189 122 -0.5169 0.0050 122 -0.0545 -0.0187 
p value (t test for mean and Wilcoxon 
rank sum test for medians) 
 (0.25) (0.86)  (0.28) (0.47)   (0.03)** (0.13) 
Change from year 1 to year 2 104 0.8869 0.0061 107 0.8252 0.0036 107 0.0379 0.0142 
p value (t test for mean and Wilcoxon 
rank sum test for medians) 
 (0.28) (0.16)  (0.29) (0.46)  (0.32) (0.07)* 
Change from year 2 to year 3 76 0.0651 0.0124 76 0.0631 0.0136 76 0.0020 0.0095 
p value (t test for mean and Wilcoxon 
rank sum test for medians) 








 SGA/Assets Operating profit/Assets Altman z-Score 
 # obs Mean Median # obs Mean Median # obs Mean Median 
Value in year -1 159 -0.0170 0.0053 194 -0.0002 0.0000 167 -0.3440 0.0994 
Change from year -1 to year 0 143 0.0425 0.0030 172 -0.0593 -0.0203 144 -0.0431 -0.1153 
p value (t test for means and 
Wilcoxon rank sum test for 
medians) 
 (0.01)*** (0.03)**   (0.01)*** (0.00)***   (0.86) (0.04)** 
Change from year  0 to year 1 95 -0.0228 0.0090 121 -0.0142 -0.0116 108 -0.9555 -0.1182 
p value (t test for mean and 
Wilcoxon rank sum test for 
medians) 
 (0.61) (0.19)  (0.63) (0.21)   (0.05)** (0.03)** 
Change from year 1 to year 2 83 0.0076 -0.0022 105 -0.0262 0.0088 97 0.5431 0.0562 
p value (t test for mean and 
Wilcoxon rank sum test for 
medians) 
 (0.61) (0.72)  (0.56) (0.14)  (0.51) (0.60) 
Change from year 2 to year 3 61 0.0312 0.0028 72 -0.0252 0.0135 66 -0.6268 -0.0310 
p value (t test for mean and 
Wilcoxon rank sum test for 
medians) 




Customer multivariate regressions 
The dependent variable in models 1,2 and 4 is the customer’s abnormal cumulated return for days 
-2 to +2 relative to the  distress-, and filing-date of the bankrupt (supplier) firm and is calculated 
using Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) with the CRSP value-weighted index as the market index. 
In column 3, for each bankrupt supplier, all the customers are formed into portfolios with the 
weight equal to the purchases  from bankrupt supplier/ total COGS of customer. Leverage is 
calculated as average of the customer’s total liabilities-to-total assets at year -1 and -2 relative to 
filing. R&D intensity is R&D expenses/ Total Assets for each customer calculated as average of 
R&D expenses-to-total assets at year -1 and -2 relative to filing. Industry concentration is the 
Herfindahl’s indexes calculated for each filing firm or customer firm using all the firms in the 
same 4 digit SIC code. Probability of reorganization is taken from the predicted values of the 
logistic regression presented in Table 4 and uses combined rank from Model 1. The percentage of 
purchases is the purchase made from the filing firm in the year in which the relationship is 
identified between the firms scaled by the total COGS of the customer in that year. The t-statistics 
reported in parentheses control for supplier industry and month of the year clustering effects. 
“*”,“**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAR over (-2, +2) for individual Customers over period defined below: 
  Distress Date     
(1) 






Chapter 11 Filing 
Date              
(4) 
Intercept -0.0536 -0.0447 -0.0792 0.0256 
(-3.05)*** (-1.23) (-1.41) (0.59) 
Customer Leverage  0.0004 -0.0127 0.0373 
 (0.01) (-0.47) (1.52) 
Customer R&D Intensity  -0.4456 -0.3873 0.0710 
 (-5.75)*** (-3.14)*** (0.57) 
Customer Industry  Herfindahl 
Index> 2000 
 -0.0005 -0.0063 0.0040 
 (-0.04) (-0.44) (0.36) 
Supplier Industry  Herfindahl 
Index> 2000 
 0.0009 0.0084 0.0035 
 (0.06) (0.61) (0.34) 
Supplier Probability of 
Reorganization 
0.0544 0.0390 0.0722 -0.0208 
(2.40)** (1.64)* (2.05)** (-0.75) 
Customer Size  0.0015 0.0030 -0.0034 
 (0.59) (0.87) (-0.99) 
Percent of Sales from 
Bankrupt supplier 
 -0.0559  -0.0350 
 (-2.01)**  (-2.81)*** 
     
     
# of observations 207 201 99 213 
P value of F statistic 0.0131  <.0001 0.0024 0.3028 






EFFECT OF CUSTOMER DISTRESS ON TRADE CREDIT  
POLICY OF SUPPLIERS   
 
3.1 Introduction 
Trade credit is an important source of short-term credit for firms in the U.S. Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) document that 18% of the total assets of U.S. firms in 1991 consisted 
of accounts receivables. More recently, Shenoy and Williams (2011) document that 
during 1980 to 2009, the median value of accounts receivables to assets was 16% for 
nonfinancial firms. The corresponding value for accounts payable to assets was 13%. 
Globally, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksomovic (2001) found that in countries such as 
Germany, France, and Italy, trade credit exceeded a quarter of total corporate assets. 
Given that it is such an important source of short-term financing, continued availability of 
trade credit may be a key determinant of whether a financially distressed firm survives 
when its ability to raise funds by other means is severely curtailed.   
Extant research finds that trade credit can act as a substitute for financial credit. 
Meltzer (1960) provides evidence that trade credit increases under tight monetary 
conditions. Petersen and Rajan (1997) posit that since the supplier’s value is determined 





liquidated and have an incentive to maintain credit sales to their distressed customers. 
They show empirically that credit-constrained customers avail more trade credit from 
their suppliers. Wilner (2000) shows theoretically that when suppliers are relatively more 
dependent on their customers, they grant more credit to financially distressed customers 
than banks do. Frank and Maksimovic (2005) also show theoretically that, in equilibrium 
suppliers may respond to distressed customers by increasing the level of trade credit.   
At the same time, a supplier also has the incentive to secure its own cash position 
and cut off trade credit or at least tighten its terms to minimize potential losses in 
bankruptcy. Indeed, extant literature provides evidence that such trade credit relationships 
can be vehicles for transmission of credit contagion. Jorion and Zhang (2009) find that 
when a firm files for Chapter 11, its largest outstanding trade creditors experience 
significant negative stock price effects and that such counterparty risk is a significant 
determinant of default clustering among industrial firms in the U.S. As described in Ng, 
Smith, and Smith (1999), a trade credit contract, in its simplest form, specifies that full 
payment is due within a specified time after delivery. Invoicing occurs either around the 
date of delivery or at the end of a billing cycle and more complex contracts could also 
include early payment discount terms. Suppliers who operate on an invoice to invoice 
basis are under no obligation to continue selling to the customer in financial distress. 
Among other means, they can request payment in advance, ask for a letter of credit, or 
switch to cash-on-delivery terms if they feel that the customer’s financial position is not 
strong enough to ensure payment for continued supply.  
Therefore, the question arises as to why in some situations suppliers do not stop 





even cut off? Anecdotal evidence is available on both sides: for instance, in September 
2010, CFO.com reported in an article that “…small companies selling to large companies 
often bend over backward to keep the business, to the point of loosening credit terms to 
customers on the brink of insolvency.”1 In contrast, in early December 1985, Atlantic 
Richfield Co., a firm buying and selling crude oil and refined products to Texaco, sent an 
internal letter urging all its staff to use "prudence" in doing business with Texaco due to 
its ongoing litigation with Penzoil (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Cornell and Shapiro 
(1987) further cite William C. Rusnack, Arco's senior vice president of marketing and 
employee relations that the "The basic message was that we'll continue doing business 
with Texaco, but if we can make the same transaction with someone of less risk, then we 
should choose someone else." Texaco filed for Chapter 11 in April 1987 but suppliers 
were dubious about its prospects 2 years prior to that.   
One of the problems with existing studies is that the quantity of trade credit 
actually extended by the supplier cannot be observed; instead, most studies draw 
inferences from the observed accounts receivables of supplier firms or from accounts 
payables of the distressed customer. For instance, Molina and Preve (2011) find that 
firms in financial distress use a significantly larger amount of trade credit to substitute 
alternative sources of financing. Shenoy and Williams (2011) also find that suppliers 
whose main customers lack access to bank lines of credit and have a higher probability of 
bankruptcy as measured by the z-score have higher amounts of outstanding trade credit. 
However, since the actual trade credit policy of the supplier towards its distressed 
customer is unobservable, it is unclear whether suppliers actually intend to support their 
distressed customers or whether customers simply delay repaying their suppliers. Both of 






these would lead to increased accounts payables of distressed customers as well as 
increased receivables for their suppliers.  
In this study, I add to the literature by studying whether the observed trade 
receivables of supplier to distressed customer vary according to the distress type of the 
customer. I hypothesize that when suppliers are trading with purely financially distressed 
customers, they will continue to extend greater support rather than when they are 
supplying to purely economically distressed firms since the chances of survival in the 
long run for the former group of firms are relatively higher. As discussed in the preceding 
chapter, financially distressed firms are overburdened with debt but their underlying 
business model is sound. In contrast, economically distressed firms have very poor 
operating performance and despite relatively low leverage, have difficulty repaying debts. 
The combination of poor performance and the inability to repay debt implies that such 
firms may not be viable at the current scale in the long run even if their leverage is 
reduced. Overall, economically distressed firms have questionable going concern value 
and thus, questionable chances of remaining a trading partner to the supplier or customer.  
From a supplier’s point of view, the present value of the cash flows forfeited is 
larger when the filing firm is economically distressed since the probability that the 
customer survives as a trading partner is relatively low. In this case, intuitively, the 
incentive for the supplier to “cut its losses” is greater than if it assesses that the distressed 
customer is likely to reemerge and continue as a trading partner. This approach does not 
completely avoid the problems associated with the other studies since it also relies on 
observed trade receivables of suppliers. However, I find that suppliers are indeed 





customers but not when they are supplying to economically distressed customer. The 
probability that a supplier is simply passively recording an increase in trade receivables 
due to nonpayment is lower. It is more likely that the supplier is actively deciding 
whether or not to extend credit to these distressed customers.  
Using distressed firms which filed for bankruptcy adds an extra layer of 
complexity to the test. Under U.S. bankruptcy laws, once a customer files Chapter 11, 
outstanding trade credit is usually treated as an unsecured claim, the class of claims 
which have the lowest priority for payment under Chapter 11. However, in practice 
bankruptcy courts may prioritize payment to suppliers so that they continue to supply to 
the bankrupt firm during the reorganization process.  
This implies that when the Chapter 11 process is involved, the incentives of the 
suppliers may vary from case to case; for example in August 2011, three of Saab’s 
suppliers sought to push it into involuntary bankruptcy so that they could claim 12 
million Euros of unpaid claims.2 If the value of claims is high enough, the supplier may 
prefer to jeopardize future business with the customer in favor of being paid currently. In 
other cases, such as when a customer is facing tort liabilities such as asbestos claims, 
suppliers may prefer that the firm file Chapter 11, not to receive the value of their claims, 
but to make sure that the going concern value of the firm is preserved in the long run. The 
level of trade credit extended could thus be jointly determined by the incentives of both 
the supplier and the filing customer characteristics. In this study, I abstract from such 
problems and instead interpret my results with caution. An increased level of trade 
                                                 
2 http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2011/08/three-suppliers-request-saab-bankruptcy-august-16-is-
judgement-day/ SAAB has not yet filed as of Nov 6th 2011 and is trying to make alternate arrangements for 






receivables for suppliers to financially distressed customers is observed in the data and no 
significant increase is observed for the suppliers to economically distressed customers. 
While this does not rule out other potential explanations completely, it is consistent with 
the explanation that suppliers assess the chances of long-run survival of their trading 
partner while deciding to extend trade credit.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the 
current U.S. bankruptcy laws relating to trade credit while Section 3.3 provides an 
overview of the literature relating to trade credit, especially in the context of distressed 
firms. Section 3.4 presents the data and methodology while Section 3.5 presents the main 
results. Section 3.6 concludes.   
 
3.2 Treatment of trade credit under U.S. bankruptcy laws  
Once a customer files Chapter 11, outstanding trade credit is usually treated as an 
unsecured claim, the class of claims which have the lowest priority for payment under 
Chapter 11. The Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9) states that the court shall allow as an 
administrative claim the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before 
the commencement of a case. The seller also has a right to reclaim any goods sold (up to 
45 days before the filing date) in the ordinary course of business provided the supplier 
asks in writing within 20 days after the filing. But the supplier’s claim to reclamation is 
behind in priority to those of the secured creditors who have security interests in the 
goods.  
After filing for Chapter 11, a firm may also decide that some of its vendors are 





that the vendor will receive payment on the prepetition claim. In general, other creditors 
of the same priority do not get paid on their prepetition claims in Chapter 11, except 
through a plan of reorganization. However, the equality of payment rule can be violated 
to allow insolvent debtors to pay vendors whose cooperation is deemed essential to a 
debtor’s continued operations and reorganization. Once the order is approved, the vendor 
that agrees to the critical status has to continue selling to the filing firm on terms which 
are either equal to or better than the ones in place before the filing.  
However, these rules apply only to the suppliers without any type of executory 
contract such as a long-term supply agreement. In this situation, the automatic stay after 
the filing stops the vendor from terminating the contract postpetition or from seeking 
payment during the bankruptcy. Section 365 of the Code grants the bankruptcy trustee 
(the filing firm as debtor-in-possession) the option to assume or reject any executory 
contract or unexpired lease. If the trustee or the debtor firm chooses to assume the 
executory contract, the vendor has to be paid in full but if the contract is rejected, this 
rejection constitutes a material breach allowing the supplier to sue for damages. 
However, the damage claim resulting from rejection is treated as a prebankruptcy claim 
against the debtor and will only be paid in the bankruptcy distribution as whatever 
fractional rate is due to general unsecured claims (Andrade, Henry, and Nanda, 2011).  
 
3.3 Literature review 
There are many theories to explain the prevalence of trade credit usage such as 
price discrimination (Brennan, Macksimovic, and Zechner, 1988) or the existence of 





may have an advantage over other types of creditors in obtaining information about their 
customers, i.e., sellers may be better informed about the customer firm’s ability to repay 
due to their ordinary course of business with the trading partner (Biais and Gollier, 1997; 
Brennan et al., 1988; Frank and Maksimovic 1998; Mian and Smith, 1992; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997; Smith, 1987). Apart from an improved ability to gather information, 
suppliers may also be better able to control buyer behavior since they can cut off 
supplies, especially if there are few alternatives available to the buyer. Further, the 
supplier can also seize goods already if the customer defaults. If the supplier operates in 
the same or in a related industry as the defaulting customer, it will be able to extract a 
higher price for such collateral compared to other credit institutions. Cunat (2007) shows 
that due to this ability, suppliers may have a lending advantage relative to banks.  
Many of these studies discuss what happens when the customer is in distress and 
potentially unable to repay debt on time. Wilner (2000) presents a model in which 
dependent suppliers are forced to grant greater credit to financially distressed customers 
as well as offer more concessions during Chapter 11 negotiations if it wants to maintain 
an enduring product market relationship with the filing customer. Frank and Maksimovic 
(2005) also model a situation where extension of trade credit for a distressed customer is 
the equilibrium outcome for suppliers.  
Petersen and Rajan (1997), who examine small business data reported in the 
NSSBF survey and analyze trade receivables, posit that since a customer’s liquidation is 
expensive for the supplier, the latter has an implied equity stake in their customer and 
may therefore extend trade credit to the financially distressed customer. They show 





take more trade credit from their suppliers. Meltzer (1960) was among the first to discuss 
the effects of economic cycles and trade credit substitution. He found that in times of 
monetary contractions, trade credit increases. Nilsen (2002) shows that during monetary 
contractions, smaller firms are more likely to rely on supplier credit. Molina and Preve 
(2011) find that firms in financial distress use a significantly larger amount of trade credit 
and that even though trade credit is relatively expensive as a source of financing, 
substitution occurs for other forms of credit when a firm is in distress. Shenoy and 
Williams (2011) find that suppliers whose main customers lack other sources of credit 
and have a higher probability of bankruptcy and are relatively more financially 
constrained have higher amounts of outstanding trade credit. All these theoretical and 
empirical studies suggest that suppliers may support their distressed customer by 
providing them with much needed financing when other forms of credit have dried out. 
On the other hand, literature also points out that distressed firms may have difficulties in 
obtaining trade credit as their suppliers have an incentive to cut them off to protect their 
own cash cycles (Altman, 1984; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Baxter, 1967).  
Since both sides of the story have supporting evidence, it leads to the conjecture 
that perhaps supplier firms neither cut off their distressed customers totally nor do they 
keep extending trade credit indiscriminately. As discussed earlier, suppliers are 
potentially able to gather more accurate information about their buyers compared to other 
lenders and casual observation suggests that many suppliers take action against their 
customer even prior to default. For instance, Sharp which was a supplier to Best Products 
Incorporated sued for $2.5 million worth unpaid supplies a few days before the latter 





cash on delivery or tightening credit terms or even refusing to supply altogether to the 
insolvent customer are also likely. In such a situation, it is likely that a supplier will 
assess the likelihood of the distressed customer surviving through the distress period and 
remaining a trading partner. If the present value of future cash flows is deemed high 
enough, then the supplier will continue to support the customer. For instance, Best 
Products Incorporated did not emerge from the Chapter 11 process as a standalone entity. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: Suppliers will have higher amounts of outstanding 
trade credit when distressed customers are financially distressed (and therefore, have a 
higher chance of emerging from the Chapter 11 process as a standalone entity) rather than 
when customers are economically distressed (and have a lower chance of emerging from 
the Chapter 11 process as a standalone entity).  
 
3.4 Data and methodology 
I start with the sample of bankrupt firms used in Chapters 1 and 2 which consists 
of 215 bankruptcies filed between the period of 1981 to 2009 as well as the 
corresponding suppliers to these bankrupt firms. In this chapter, I only investigate the 
trade credit extension policy of suppliers to distressed customers. Thus, the sample of 
firms which are customers to distressed suppliers is not considered here. To measure 
trade credit extended by suppliers, I scale the accounts (trade) receivables of suppliers in 
each period by the sales made in the same period. Ideally, credit sales would be used but 
since only total sale is observable, it is used as the proxy. I calculate the change in the 
supplier’s trade credit in the prefiling year as well as in 4 successive postfiling years. In 





firm basis as in Barber and Lyon (1996) and Fee and Thomas (2004). Each supplier is 
matched with a control firm chosen on the basis of industry, asset size, and operating 
performance in the prefiling year. Starting with the entire universe of Compustat firms, 
all bankrupt firms and their suppliers and customers are eliminated. From the remaining 
firms, those in the same two digit SIC code and with asset size at the end of the year prior 
to bankruptcy between 25% to 200% of the supplier and operating profit percentage 
between 90% to 110% of the supplier are identified. From the set of these possible 
matches, the one closest in operating performance to the supplier is chosen. If matches 
are not found at this stage, the industry screen is relaxed to a 1-digit SIC match 
requirement. At the next stage, the industry matching requirement is removed and 
matches are made only on the basis of asset size and performance. If there is still no 
match, I use the operating performance matching only at the last stage. If the match firm 
drops out, it is replaced with the next best available match. There is attrition in the sample 
each year as not all suppliers have more than one match using the most relaxed matching 
criteria and not all suppliers have data for all years on Compustat.  
Table 3.1 presents the trade credit statistics of the customers which are the 
bankrupt firms as well as their suppliers. These figures are averaged over the two fiscal 
years preceding the one in which the bankrupt firm filed Chapter 11.  The mean payables 
(accounts payables scales by cost of goods sold) of the bankrupt firms is 31% (14% 
median). Fisman and Love (2003) create stock and flow measures of industry-wide 
importance of trade credit usage and find that in their sample, trade credit is more 
important as a source of financing than short-term debt.3 They found that motor vehicle 
                                                 






industry and petroleum industry were the largest users of trade credit in the 1980s. 
Accounts payables made up nearly 12% of their assets. At the lower end of the spectrum, 
drug, leather, pottery, pulp, and paper manufacturers used the least trade credit. Payables 
amounted to around 6% of their assets. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) show 
that Canada, US, Ireland, and the United Kingdom are heavy users of trade credit relative 
to short-term debt and in their sample, US firms have slightly more than 14% of their 
sales tied up in the form of receivables.4 From Table 3.1, a supplier has, on average, 22% 
of its sales as outstanding receivables. Such large levels of trade credit implies that in 
addition to the loss of future sales, it is likely that trade creditors have extended credit 
prior to the Chapter 11 filing that may not be repaid in full. Given the quantities of 
potential losses, the decision to keep extending trade credit, with or without any 
modification of terms, is unlikely to be a passive decision for the supplier.  
 
3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Univariate results  
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents annual univariate measures of match firm adjusted 
accounts receivables for suppliers from the prefiling year to 3 years after the customer 
files for Chapter 11. I find that the only year in which the mean (significant at the 5% 
level) and median (insignificant) accounts receivables of suppliers increases is from the 
year before filing to the year of filing. This is consistent with suppliers extending trade 
credit to customers which are in distress. However, since actual credit sales amount is 
unobserved, this is also consistent with distressed customer firms taking more time to pay 
their creditors back and trade receivables remaining longer on the books of the supplier. 
                                                 





As discussed in prior sections, existing empirical evidence such as that in Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) shows that suppliers extend trade credit to financially constrained 
customers. Similarly, Molina and Preve (2011) and Shenoy and Williams (2011) also find 
that financially distressed customers receive support from its suppliers in the form of 
trade credit. However, it should be noted that suppliers, especially those which operate on 
an order-to-order basis always have the opportunity to change their terms of sale and not 
extend trade credit. Figure 3.1 plots the match-firm adjusted trade receivables of all 
supplier firms for which data for seven consecutive quarters around the filing period were 
available.5 As can be seen, supporting the results in Table 3.2, the graph shows that the 
quantity of trade receivables for the suppliers increases for three quarters prior to filing.  
Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the results of splitting the sample by the type of 
distress of the filing customer. As discussed in Chapter 2, I use Lemmon, Ma, and 
Tashjian’s (2009) method to classify each bankruptcy into financial-, economic- or 
mixed-type of distress. I sort the bankrupt firms into deciles (within sample) and number 
them from 0 to 9 (0 being smallest and 9 being largest) based on industry adjusted 
EBITDA-to-assets averaged over the 2 years immediately preceding the filing year and 
repeat the same process using average leverage.6 Industry adjustments to the EBITDA are 
made by subtracting the industry median EBITDA-to-total assets from the sample firms’ 
EBITDA-to-total assets. Industry medians are calculated based on 4-digit SIC codes 
provided that five or more firms reside in the industry, excluding the sample firm. If the 
                                                 
5 All 32 suppliers for which data are available are used in the graph. None of these have long-term contracts 
with their bankrupt customer. The number of firms is restricted to forty-two because many Compustat firms 
do not report the value of RECTRQ. Ten more firms drop out because these have do not have data for all 7 
quarters.  
6 Since our sample is relatively small, if we do not find data for the past 2 years, we take the last available 





4-digit SIC code contains fewer than five firms, we define the industry median using the 
3-digit SIC code and continue to the 2-digit level until five firms are found. Leverage is 
calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. The rankings are then summed, 
resulting in a combined rank from 0 to 18, with firms in categories 0-5 being 
economically distressed and firms in categories 14-18 financially distressed. Those in the 
middle are classified as having mixed distress.  
As can be seen, only the group of suppliers to financially distressed firms has 
consistent and significant increases in both the mean and the median trade receivables. 
This is consistent with the notion that it would be more beneficial for a supplier to extend 
trade credit to customers who are more likely to remain solvent. Since a matched sample 
method is used, the results show that when compared to the supplier of a healthy firm, the 
supplier to a financially distressed firm actually has a higher level of trade credit 
outstanding. Similarly, on the economically distressed side, the match firm’s customer 
has a higher relative likelihood of being distressed (since economic distress is due to low 
leverage and low profits and due to customer demand shifting away). Hence, the 
insignificant change in the receivables is expected since both the sample supplier and its 
match are supplying to a distressed customer. Unreported results from splitting the 
sample along reliant and nonreliant suppliers show that the former group has a significant 
(on a mean basis) increase in their trade credit whereas nonreliant customers have 
insignificant changes.  
Since the number of firms in the economically distressed and the financially 
distressed category are small, Table 3.3 presents the results from changing the 





economically distressed, Panel A presents results where 0-7 are classified as 
economically distressed and firms in categories 11-18 financially distressed (instead of 
14-18). The remaining firms are classified as mixed distress. Panel B presents results 
from using a classification scheme where the mixed category is cut out: firms having 
combined rank measure between 0-9 are economically distressed firms while those with 
combined rank between 10 and 18 are financially distressed. While we see that in Panel 
A of this table, the results from the financially distressed group actually becomes stronger 
by increasing the number of firms in the group, in Panel B, the categorization is coarse 
and even though the number of firms rises, the results are only marginally significant 
though still positive for the financially distressed group. This shows that only those which 
are actually near the top end of the combined rank spectrum record a significant increase 
in their trade credit receivables. This is consistent with suppliers actively deciding to 
support these firms instead of abandoning them.  
 
3.5.2 Multivariate results 
Table 3.4 presents results from the following multivariate regressions where prob. 
of reorg. is used as an abbreviation for the probability of reorganization calculated from 
the logit model as shown in Table 2.4. 
 
Supplier receivables pre-filing-year = α + β1prob. of reorg .+ β2 controls + ε  (1) 
 






∆ (supplier receivables) pre-filing to filing year = α + β1 prob. of reorg. + β2 controls + ε  (3)  
 
Column (1) uses the match-firm-adjusted trade receivables of the supplier in the 
prefiling year as the dependent variable (equation 1 above), column (2) uses the match-
firm-adjusted trade receivables from the filing year (equation 2 above) while column (3) 
uses the change in match-firm-adjusted receivable from the prefiling year to the year of 
filing (equation 3 above). The rationale for the regressions is that the relative importance 
of the probability of reorganization as the customer’s distress progresses towards filing 
Chapter 11 is investigated. The third regression measures the change in receivables 
relative to the base period.  
The value of the probability of successful reorganization is taken from Table 2.4 
in Chapter 2. The probability of reorganization is estimated from a logit model which 
uses the filing firm size, its industry distress, as well as the classification into economic 
versus financial distress to predict the chance of successfully emerging from the 
bankruptcy process as a standalone entity. Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) provide 
evidence that firms may attempt to match the maturities of their short-term assets with 
their short-term liabilities, i.e., a positive relationship exists between receivables/sales 
and payables/COGS. I include the amount of trade credit used by a firm as a control 
variable. I calculate the use of trade credit by a firm as the ratio of accounts payable to 
cost of goods sold. Also included are control variables such as firm operating profit 
margin (EBITDA/total assets), firm size (log of total assets), Tobin’s Q (market value of 
assets/book value of assets), sales intensity (sales/total assets), and book leverage (book 





market share may be able to exercise higher bargaining power over their dependent 
suppliers. Therefore, I include the market share of the firm and its bankrupt customer 
(Herfindahl indices of both) as controls in the regression. Finally, I use the supplier’s 
Altman z-score measure (Altman 1968), which is used to predict bankruptcy to measure 
the financial health of the supplier. All the independent variables are measured as the 
difference between the value of the supplier less its matching firm in either the year just 
prior to the filing or the year of filing.  
From the results presented in column (3) of Table 3.4, it can be seen that suppliers 
experience a significant increase in trade receivables if the probability of a successful 
reorganization for the customer is high. Results from columns (1) and (2) demonstrate the 
growing importance of the probability of reorganization. While the coefficient is 
insignificant, though positive, in the prefiling year, it increases both in magnitude and 
significance over the next year. It is worthwhile to note here the data used for calculating 
the probability of reorganization is taken as the average of the two years prior to the pre-
filing year. This implies that the information is already known at the time of the changes 
in the trade receivables.  
Overall, the results show that suppliers may extend trade credit to a distressed 
customer if the chance of survival is assessed to be high. With a low probability of 
survival, suppliers may value their own cash cycle more and refuse to extend credit.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I study the effects of customer’s financial distress on trade 





significantly in the year of filing. However, this observation is driven solely by the 
suppliers to financially distressed firms. This result is robust to different definitions of the 
various types of distress. This result provides support to previous studies that have found 
that supplier firms do not cut off their distressed customers but instead continue to 
support them, e.g., as in Rajan and Peterson (1997). However, it adds to the previous 
literature by showing that not all distressed firms are “supported” in this manner. 
Suppliers may actually be actively deciding which distressed customer to support and to 
what extent. The decision may depend on an assessment of whether the distressed firm is 
likely to survive and emerge through the distress and bankruptcy as a standalone 
customer. If the customer does emerge, then the present values of potential cash flows are 
high enough to justify supporting the customer prior to the Chapter 11 filing. Consistent 
with this idea, I find that the distress type as well as the probability of reorganization is 
associated with whether the supplier records an increase in the level of the trade 















Sample statistics of trade receivables and payables  
Trade Receivables are scaled by sales and averaged across years -3 and -2 while Trade Payables 
are scaled by cost of goods sold and averaged across years -3 and -2.  
Variable N Mean Median 
Bankrupt firm’s Trade Receivables/ Sales 209 0.22 0.15 
Bankrupt firm’s Trade Payables/COGS 208 0.31 0.14 
Supplier Total Receivables-to-total sales 277 0.219 0.157 










































Change in supplier’s trade receivables in the years around customer’s filing 
The table presents the changes in matching firm-adjusted trade receivables for suppliers to filing 
firms. Each value is based on a difference found by subtracting the variable value of the 
corresponding matching firms. (Year n – Year n-1) difference of each measure is the difference 
between the values in the corresponding years. Year 0 is the year of bankruptcy announcement 
while Year -1 is the prefiling year. The p values reported in parentheses are calculated from t tests 
for the means and from Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests for the medians. “*”,“**”, and “***” indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 All Suppliers 
Trade Receivables/Total Asset Num Obs Mean Median 
Value in Year -1 178 -0.0948 -0.0147 
Change from Year -1 to Year 0 158 0.0710 0.0012 
  (0.03)** (0.27) 
Change from Year 0 to Year 1 114 0.0658 -0.0062 
  (0.44) (0.64) 
Change from Year 1 to Year 2 103 -0.0710 -0.0021 
  (0.29) (0.89) 
Change from Year 2 to Year 3 72 0.1200 -0.0011 




















Change in supplier receivables around filing by customer distress type 
Panel A: Standard definition of Distress Type 
The table presents the changes in matching firm-adjusted trade receivables for suppliers to filing 
firms grouped into subsamples according to the distress type based on the Combined Rank 
measure. Each value of trade credit is based on a difference found by subtracting the variable 
value of the corresponding matching firms. Matching firms are found as in Table-10 above.  
(Year n – Year n-1) difference of each measure is the difference between the values in the 
corresponding years. Year 0 is the year of bankruptcy announcement while Year -1 is the pre-
filing year. Combined Rank measure. Combined rank is constructed similarly to Lemmon et al. 
(2009) by 1) averaging the firm’s year -3 and year -2 industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets and 
ranking this into deciles among all Chapter 11 sample firms, 2) averaging the firm’s year -3 and 
year -2 leverage and ranking this into deciles among all Chapter 11 sample firms, and 3) 
summing these two decile rankings. Industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets is the average of the 
sample firm’s year -3 and -2 EBITDA-to-total assets minus the industry median EBITDA-to-total 
assets where both years are available. When any one is unavailable, the other is taken. The 
industry is defined at the 4-digit SIC level provided that it contains a minimum of five firms. 
Otherwise, the industry is defined at the 3-digit or 2-digit SIC level. Leverage is measured as 
average of total liabilities-total assets at year -3 and -2. Firms with combined rank of 0 upto 5 are 
classified as economically distressed and those with the measure between 14-18 are financially 
distressed. The remainders (6-13) are classified as mixed distressed firms. The p values reported 
in parentheses are calculated from t tests for the means and from Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests for 
the medians. “*”,“**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Suppliers to Economically 
Distressed Filing Firms 
Suppliers to Mixed 
Distressed Filing Firms 
Suppliers to Financially 
Distressed Filing Firms 
Num 
Obs 
Mean Median Num 
Obs 
Mean Median Num 
Obs 
Mean Median 
16 0.0890 0.0151 104 -0.0161 -0.0111 38 0.0127 -0.0092 
16 0.1530 0.0031 104 0.0693 -0.0045 38 0.0412 0.0358 























Table 3.3 continued 
Panel B: Modified definition of Distress Type—1 
 
The table presents the changes in matching firm-adjusted trade receivables for suppliers to filing 
firms grouped into subsamples according to the distress type based on the Combined Rank 
measure. Each value of trade credit is based on a difference found by subtracting the variable 
value of the corresponding matching firms. Matching firms are found as in Table-10 above.  
(Year n – Year n-1) difference of each measure is the difference between the values in the 
corresponding years. Year 0 is the year of bankruptcy announcement while Year -1 is the pre-
filing year. Combined Rank measure. Combined rank is constructed similarly to Lemmon et al. 
(2009) by 1) averaging the firm’s year -3 and year -2 industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets and 
ranking this into deciles among all Chapter 11 sample firms, 2) averaging the firm’s year -3 and 
year -2 leverage and ranking this into deciles among all Chapter 11 sample firms, and 3) 
summing these two decile rankings. Industry-adjusted EBITDA-to-assets is the average of the 
sample firm’s year -3 and -2 EBITDA-to-total assets minus the industry median EBITDA-to-total 
assets where both years are available. When any one is unavailable, the other is taken. The 
industry is defined at the 4-digit SIC level provided that it contains a minimum of five firms. 
Otherwise, the industry is defined at the 3-digit or 2-digit SIC level. Leverage is measured as 
average of total liabilities-total assets at year -3 and -2. Firms with combined rank of 0 upto 7 are 
classified as economically distressed and those with the measure between 8-10 are financially 
distressed. The remainders (11-18) are classified as mixed distressed firms. The p values reported 
in parentheses are calculated from t tests for the means and from Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests for 
the medians. “*”,“**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 Suppliers to Economically 
Distressed Filing Firms (0-
7)  
Suppliers to Mixed 
Distressed Filing Firms (8-
10)  
Suppliers to Financially 




Mean  Median  Num 
Obs  
Mean  Median  Num 
Obs  




35   0.0093   0.0090  66   -0.1145  -0.0111 57   -0.1135   -0.0175  
Year after 
filing  
35   0.1210   0.0000  66   -0.0640  -0.0230 57   -0.0408   0.0004  
  (0.17)  (0.78)   (0.38)  (0.53)   (0.13)  (0.00)***  
 
Panel C: Modified definition of Distress Type—2 
 Suppliers to Economically Distressed 
Filing Firms (0-9)  
Suppliers to Financially Distressed 
Filing Firms (10-18)  
 Num 
Obs  





80  -0.0104 0.0000 78 -0.1658 -0.0189 
Year after 
filing  
80  0.07906 -0.0148 78 0.0514 0.0086 






Multivariate regressions of supplier trade receivables 
The table presents the regression of trade receivables of the suppliers to filing firms. All variables 
except industry concentrations, probability of reorganization and reliant-supplier are calculated 
on a matched firm adjusted basis. Industry concentrations are binary variables for both the 
customer and the supplier if their respective Herfindahl Indices are greater than 0.2. The 
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 are the match firm adjusted trade receivables of the 
suppliers in the prefiling and the filing year, respectively, whereas in column 3, the dependent 
variable is the change in trade receivables from the prefiling to the filing year.  The t-statistics 
control for supplier industry and month of the year clustering effects and are reported in 
parentheses. “*”,“**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable AR/Sales in pre-filing year      
(1) 
AR/Sales in 
filing year     
(2) 
Change in AR/Sales over 
the year before filing to the 
year of filing              
(3) 
Intercept -0.0984 -0.1874 -0.0644 
(-1.10) (-2.09)** (-1.29) 
Altman Z Score of 
Supplier  
0.0049 0.0096 -0.0115 
(0.92) (1.21) (-2.33)** 
Log (Assets) of 
Supplier 
-0.0061 0.0272 0.0015 
(-0.18) (1.49) (0.11) 
Sales Intensity -0.0077 -0.0194 0.0180 
(-0.61) (-1.81)* (1.73)* 
Accounts Payable of 
Supplier 
0.1036 0.0230 -0.0269 
(2.40)** (1.27) (-1.19) 
Operating Profit 
Margin of Supplier 
1.8676 -0.0497 -0.5207 
(0.61) (-0.53) (-0.33) 
Supplier Leverage 0.0124 -0.0182 -0.0197 
(0.90) (-0.41) (-1.28) 
Supplier Industry 
Concentration 
0.0375 0.0234 -0.0263 
(1.93)* (0.95) (-2.32)** 
Customer Probability 
of Reorganization 
0.0701 0.1875 0.1103 
(0.74) (1.94)* (1.93)* 
Customer Industry 
Concentration 
0.0221 0.0083 0.0065 
(0.74) (0.27) (0.31) 
Tobin's Q of Supplier 0.0006 -0.0026 -0.0063 
(0.09) (0.16) (1.36) 
# of observations 117 122 117 
P value of F statistic 0.0289 0.0279 0.0372 
















Quarterly receivables around the filing period 
Plots the matched-firm-adjusted Trade Receivables /Total Sales for suppliers of filing firms for 
which we are able to find quarterly data for seven quarters around the filing date. The total 
number of supplier firms for each quarter is 32 and the average across all suppliers is used for 
each quarter. Each value is adjusted by subtracting the value of a matched firm chosen on the 
basis of Barber and Lyon (1996). Matching firms are the closest firms to each sample firm by 
industry, size (50%-150% of sales) and past performance (measured as ROA in the year prior to 
bankruptcy announcement).  Quarter 0 is the quarter period over which the Chapter 11 was filed 
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